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AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
KATHLEEN E. FOLEY∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review has long been considered an “axiomatic” part of 
Australia’s legal system,1 despite the lack of any express provision in the 
Australian Constitution conferring such a power on the High Court. In 
Mark Tushnet’s terms, Australian judicial review is “strong-form,” as the 
High Court maintains “general authority to determine what the 
Constitution means” and its “constitutional interpretations are authoritative 
and binding” on the legislatures and executives at the federal, State, and 
Territory levels.2 With the United States acting as the paradigmatic 
example of the “strong-form” model, one might assume that Australian 
judicial review operates similarly to judicial review in the United States. 
However, such an assumption is mistaken.3 A unique creature with its own 
distinctive history, Australian judicial review deserves greater scholarly 
attention than it has been given. With that in mind, this Article endeavors 
to evaluate the development of judicial review of legislation in Australia.4  
Part I outlines the basic structure of Australia’s constitutional system 
and considers the source and operation of Australian judicial review. Part 
II examines the High Court’s approach to judicial review by considering 
three phases in the Court’s history. First, this Part surveys the formative 
years of the High Court and the development of its legalistic approach to 
judicial review, with particular attention given to the High Court’s earliest 
 
 
 ∗ B.A., LL.B. (Hons) (U.W.A.), LL.M. (Harv.). Associate, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. 
I wish to thank Rosalind Dixon for her valuable insights and support, as well as the following 
members of the Harvard Law School faculty for their comments and encouragement: Professor 
Charles Fried, Professor Richard Fallon, and Dean Elena Kagan. The opinions expressed in this Article 
are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of Orrick, Herrington & 
Sutcliffe LLP or any of its clients. 
 1. Austl. Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1, 262–63 (Fullagar, J.) 
[hereinafter Communist Party Case]. 
 2. Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2784 (2003). 
 3. Mary Crock & Ronald McCallum, Australia’s Federal Courts: Their Origin, Structure, and 
Jurisdiction, 46 S.C. L. REV. 719, 733 (1995).  
 4. This Article uses the term “judicial review” to refer to the High Court’s exercise of its power 
to declare statutes passed by federal, state, or territory legislatures to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). As will be discussed, the High Court often refers 
to Marbury when seeking to establish the basis of Australian judicial review. E.g., Communist Party 
Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. at 262. This Article will not examine judicial review of executive or 
administrative action. 
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years, from 1903 to 1919, and Sir Owen Dixon’s tenure as Chief Justice 
from 1952 to 1964.5 Second, this Part considers the Mason Court (1987-
1995),6 which was the first High Court to conduct its work without the 
oversight of the Privy Council.7 Widely regarded as Australia’s most 
activist High Court, the Mason Court took a very different view of its 
judicial review power,8 making its work of particular interest in this 
Article. Finally, Part II studies the contemporary High Court, the Gleeson 
Court, and its attempt to reign in the perceived activism of the Mason 
years. Examining the High Court’s constitutional jurisprudence beginning 
in 1998, the year of Chief Justice Gleeson’s appointment,9 this Article 
contends that the Gleeson Court’s approach to judicial review bears many 
hallmarks of the legalistic approach adopted by the early High Court. 
I. AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL REVIEW: BUILDING BLOCKS 
A. The Australian Constitution’s Basic Structure 
By a legislative act of the United Kingdom Parliament,10 the Australian 
Constitution joined “the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania” to make  “one indissoluble Federal 
Commonwealth.”11 The Australian colonies chose to federate, not out of 
revolutionary desires to separate from the United Kingdom but instead 
under the belief that they might benefit from a central government with the 
 
 
 5. Leslie Zines, Dixon Court, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
220 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION].  
 6. At the outset, it is important to emphasize Sir Gerard Brennan’s observation that, although 
describing phases of the Court by reference to the presiding Chief Justice is “a useful shorthand,” it is 
not meant to diminish the contribution of each member of the Court during any particular period of 
time. Sir Gerard Brennan, A Tribute to Sir Anthony Mason, in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION: THE 
MASON COURT IN AUSTRALIA 10 (Cheryl Saunders ed., 1996) [hereinafter COURTS OF FINAL 
JURISDICTION]. Moreover, it should be noted that the eras of the High Court’s work discussed in this 
Article certainly have blurred edges. For example, some of the hallmarks of the Mason Court’s 
approach can certainly be seen in cases decided prior to Mason’s appointment as Chief Justice. 
 7. Keith Mason, Citizenship, in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION, supra note 6, at 43. 
 8. Cheryl Saunders, The Mason Court in Context, in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION, supra 
note 6, at 7. 
 9. Bret Walker, Gleeson, (Anthony) Murray, in OXFORD COMPANION 305 (Tony Blackshield et 
al. eds., 2001).  
 10. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT 1900, § 9 (U.K.). 
 11. AUSTL. CONST. pmbl. It should be noted that there are no references to Western Australia in 
the preamble. There was a good deal of uncertainty about whether Western Australia would join the 
Federation, and the Western Australian referendum on the question was not held until three weeks 
after the enactment of Australia’s Constitution. Consequently, Covering Clause 3 of the Constitution 
provided for Western Australia’s possible late entry. Documenting a Democracy: Australia’s Story, 
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item.asp?dID=11 (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). 
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power to legislate on matters of common concern.12 The Australian 
Constitution was “drafted by a select group of delegates to a series of 
constitutional conventions held in Australia during the late 1890s, and then 
endorsed by the voters at referenda.”13 
The Australian constitutional framers were influenced by both the 
English legal tradition, under which the Australian colonies were 
established and governed, and the United States Constitution.14 Like the 
United States Constitution, the Australian Constitution establishes a 
federal system of government, consisting of the federal government 
(referred to in the Constitution as “the Commonwealth”), States, and 
Territories.15 The Australian Constitution gives the federal legislature 
enumerated powers,16 leaving state parliaments with residual powers.  
Like its American counterpart, the Australian Constitution devotes 
separate chapters to the federal legislature (Chapter I), executive (Chapter 
II), and judiciary (Chapter III). However, unlike the United States 
Constitution, the Australian Constitution describes a parliamentary system 
of government.17 The Federal Parliament is comprised of the Queen, 
Senate, and House of Representatives.18 The two Houses of Parliament 
consist of members “directly chosen by the people,”19 with each State 
sending an equal number of senators.20 In accordance with the 
parliamentary system, section 64 of the Australian Constitution provides 
that “no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three 
months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of 
Representatives.”21 The framers viewed responsible government as a 
 
 
 12. JOHN A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 1–2 (1972). See also 
N.K.F. O’Neill, Constitutional Human Rights in Australia, 17 FED. L. REV. 85, 85 (1987). 
 13. PETER J. HANKS & DEBORAH CASS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION LAW: MATERIALS AND 
COMMENTARY 4 (6th ed. 1999).  
 14. See Stephen Gageler, Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review, 
17 FED. L. REV. 162, 164 (1987).  
 15. Contemporary Australia has six states (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia), two mainland territories (the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory), and a number of external territories. CIA—The World Factbook—
Australia, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html (last visited Sept. 
8, 2007). 
 16. Although this Article uses the word “federal,” the Constitution itself employs the term “the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth.” AUSTL. CONST. § 1. Section 51 is the principal provision granting 
and outlining the federal legislature’s powers. AUSTL. CONST. § 51.  
 17. Simply put, this form of government involves “an executive government chosen from and 
responsible to Parliament.” Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A 
Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).  
 18. AUSTL. CONST. § 1.  
 19. Id. § 7 (regarding the Senate), § 24 (regarding the House of Representatives). 
 20. Id. § 7. 
 21. Id. § 64.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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critical concept underlying the new constitutional framework, creating 
“the British heart in an otherwise American federal body.”22 As discussed 
by Stephen Gageler, incorporating a parliamentary system into a 
constitution firmly modeled on the United States Constitution creates a 
tension,23 in part because a parliamentary system is inconsistent with a 
strict separation of powers.24  
Importantly, the Australian Constitution also established a federal 
supreme court, the High Court of Australia.25 Although modeled on the 
United States Supreme Court, the High Court differs significantly from its 
United States cousin in that the Australian Constitution expressly confers 
jurisdiction on the High Court to hear and determine appeals from both 
state and federal courts.26 It should be noted that under the original 
Australian Constitution, High Court decisions could be appealed to the 
Privy Council.27 In fact, the High Court did not truly become the apex of 
Australia’s judicial system until 1986, when the last of a number of 
legislative enactments aimed at abolishing appeals to the Privy Council 
was passed.28 However, the most important connection between Australia 
and the United Kingdom remains: Australia is a constitutional monarchy.29 
Its head of state, the Governor-General, is the representative of the Queen 
of England in her capacity as Queen of Australia.30 
 
 
 22. Gageler, supra note 14, at 172. Bruce Ackerman describes the Australian Constitution as a 
“fascinating hybrid of British and American elements.” Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of 
Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 674 (2000). 
 23. See Gageler, supra note 14, at 164. 
 24. See Mason, supra note 17, at 4.  
 25. AUSTL. CONST. § 71. 
 26. Id. § 73; Erin Daly, United States Supreme Court, in OXFORD COMPANION 693 (Tony 
Blackshield et al. eds., 2001).  
 27. However, cases relating to “the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the 
Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional 
powers of any two or more States” required, pursuant to § 74 as originally enacted, a certificate from 
the High Court to be appealed. AUSTL. CONST. § 74.  
 28. The passage of the Australia Acts, 1986 (Austl.) and (U.K.) marked the final step in the 
abolition of appeals from Australian courts to the Privy Council. This abolition process began with the 
Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act, 1968 (Austl.) and the Privy Council (Appeals from the 
High Court) Act, 1975 (Austl.). Mason, supra note 17, at 3; JM Bennett, Establishment of Court, in 
OXFORD COMPANION 247 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). Although in theory an avenue remains 
to bring appeals to the Privy Council, the possibility is foreclosed for all practical purposes. See 
HANKS & CASS, supra note 13, at 27.  
 29. See HANKS & CASS, supra note 13, at 28.  
 30. Section 61 of the Australian Constitution vests the executive power of the Commonwealth in 
the Queen, exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative. AUSTL. CONST. § 61. 
In a 1999 referendum, Australians voted against amending the Constitution to change Australia from a 
constitutional monarchy to a republic. Australian Election Commission, http://www.aec.gov.au/ 
Elections/referendums/1999_Reforendum_Reports_Statistics/key_Results.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 
2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/4
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The framers of the Australian Constitution did not include a Bill of 
Rights.31 This decision, which subsequent generations have left 
unchanged, leaves Australia an outlier in modern constitutional systems.32 
This does not mean that the Australian Constitution confers no rights. It 
confers a number of express rights33 and has been interpreted to confer 
implied freedoms.34  
However, the framers’ decision to not include a Bill of Rights has had 
an enormous impact on the direction of Australian constitutional law. In 
stark contrast to other constitutional systems, Australia’s constitutional 
jurisprudence does not include a large body of work in the field of 
individual rights.35 Rather, it is principally concerned with the 
relationships between federal and state parliaments, executives, and 
courts.36  
B. Source of Judicial Review in Australia 
The legitimacy of the High Court’s power of judicial review is well 
established and rarely questioned.37 Surprisingly, however, its exact 
constitutional source is unclear. No provision in the Australian 
 
 
 31. Disagreement exists regarding the framers’ intentions in not including a written Bill of 
Rights. The conventional view is that the framers considered the possibility of including a written Bill 
of Rights but decided against it, believing that rights would be adequately protected by the common 
law and legislatures. Tony Blackshield, Bill of Rights, in OXFORD COMPANION 62 (Tony Blackshield 
et al. eds., 2001). However, some scholars take issue with this view. See, e.g., GEORGE WILLIAMS, 
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 25 (1999).  
 32. Blackshield, supra note 31, at 62–63. 
 33. Adrienne Stone notes that the constitutional provisions most often categorized as “express 
rights” include sections 116 (the free exercise of religion), 80 (the right to a jury trial), 51(xxxi) (the 
“just terms” requirement of the acquisition power), and 117 (the prevention of discrimination based on 
state residence). Adrienne Stone, Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive 
Disagreement, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 29, 31 (2005).  
 34. An example is the implied freedom of political communication. See, e.g., Lange v. Austl. 
Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520.  
 35. See David S. Bogen, The Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech in Australia and the 
United States: Incidental Restrictions and Generally Applicable Laws, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 53, 56 
(1997).  
 36. See Collins J. Seitz, Judicial Review and the American Constitution, 17 FED. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1987). 
 37. Mason states there has been “unqualified acceptance” of judicial review’s legitimacy. Mason, 
supra note 17, at 6. See also Gerhardy v. Brown (1985) 159 C.L.R. 70, 157–58 (Dawson, J.); In the 
Marriage of Cormick (1984) 156 C.L.R 170, 177 (Gibbs, C.J.); Vict. v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 
C.L.R. 338, 364 (Barwick, C.J.) [hereinafter Victoria v. Commonwealth]. However, some scholars 
question the constitutionality of judicial review in Australia. See, e.g., P.H. LANE, LANE’S 
COMMENTARY ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 14 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter LANE’S 
COMMENTARY]; James A. Thomson, Constitutional Authority for Judicial Review: A Contribution 
from the Framers of the Australian Constitution, in THE CONVENTION DEBATES 1891–1898: 
COMMENTARIES, INDICES AND GUIDE 173 (Gregory Craven ed., 1986). 
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Constitution expressly authorizes judicial review. Rather, the power of 
judicial review is said to arise by implication from several different 
constitutional provisions.38 No generally accepted view exists regarding 
which provisions support this implication.39  
The strongest case for implying a power of judicial review relies upon 
Covering Clause 5 of the Australian Constitution, which states that “[t]his 
Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the 
Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every 
State and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in 
the laws of any State.”40 The power of judicial review supposedly springs 
from Covering Clause 5’s requirement that federal laws made “under the 
Constitution” are binding.41 According to this argument, courts, charged 
with administering the law, must be able to determine whether a law is 
made “under the Constitution” to decide if that law is binding.42 A similar 
argument is made with respect to section 76(i) of the Australian 
Constitution, which empowers the Federal Parliament to confer 
jurisdiction upon the High Court in matters “[a]rising under this 
Constitution, or involving its interpretation.”43 It is contended that this 
provision “impliedly acknowledges the Court’s responsibility for judicial 
review of federal statutes for constitutional validity.”44  
Section 75 of the Australian Constitution, which provides for the High 
Court’s original jurisdiction, is also relied upon as a basis for the judicial 
review power. In Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Commonwealth,45 Justices 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne relied upon section 75, 
particularly section 75(v), as “introduc[ing] into the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth an entrenched minimum provision of judicial review.”46 
Although the joint Justices were principally concerned with judicial 
review of administrative action, their Honors seemed to rely on section 75 
as supporting the judicial review power generally,47 going on to state that 
 
 
 38. See Justice Michael Kirby, Judicial Review in a Time of Terrorism—Business as Usual, 22 S. 
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 21, 22–24 (2006). 
 39. See generally id. 
 40. AUSTL. CONST. covering clause 5. 
 41.  O’Toole v. Charles David Proprietary Ltd. (1991) 171 C.L.R. 232, 251 (Mason, C.J.); id. at 
272 (Brennan, J.). 
 42. Although Lane sees no constitutional basis for judicial review, his outline of this argument is 
useful. LANE’S COMMENTARY, supra note 37, at 13–14. 
 43. AUSTL. CONST. § 76(i).  
 44. Mason, supra note 17, at 6. In this regard, Mason also refers to section 74 of the Constitution. 
Id. 
 45. (2003) 211 C.L.R. 476 (Gleeson, C.J.). 
 46. Id. at 513. 
 47. Id. at 513–14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/4
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“[u]nder the Constitution of the Commonwealth the ultimate decision-
maker in all matters where there is a contest, is [the High] Court.”48 
Another constitutional provision relied upon to support the judicial 
review power is section 109, which provides that a state law inconsistent 
with a federal law shall be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.49 It is 
contended that section 109 “contemplated that the courts would strike 
down inconsistent state laws,” thus providing a basis for the judicial 
review power.50 
Apart from textual arguments, the most common justification for the 
existence of the High Court’s judicial review power is originalist, 
contending that the framers intended the High Court to possess such a 
power.51 Certainly, support for this conclusion is readily found in the 
Convention debates.52 For example, at the 1897 Convention in Adelaide, 
Edmund Barton, who would become Australia’s first Prime Minister and 
then Justice of the first High Court, argued the new Federation needed a 
court that could arbitrate disputes under the Constitution, including 
disputes among States and disputes between States and the federal 
government.53  
Although foreign to the British parliamentary system, Barton’s 
proposal sparked little controversy at the Convention.54 For the framers, 
federalism was new, and potentially dangerous, territory.55 The delegates 
were clearly conscious of the need for a strong court which would protect 
the States from any over-reaching by the Federal Parliament of its 
constitutional powers.56 Moreover, by the time the framers were debating 
the form the new Australian Constitution should take, the Australian 
colonial courts had already been exercising a power of judicial review for 
some time.57 In addition, judicial review was an established element of the 
 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Section 109 is the equivalent of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, para. 2. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 140 (Tony 
Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). 
 50. Mason, supra note 17, at 6. 
 51. Brian J. Galligan, Judicial Review in the Australian Federal System: Its Origin and Function, 
10 FED. L. REV. 367, 381 (1979); Mason, supra note 17, at 3; HANKS & CASS, supra note 13, at 20; 
George Winterton, The Communist Party Case, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 108, 
127 (H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 2003).  
 52. See Galligan, supra note 51, at 379 (citing Federal Convention Debates (Adelaide, 1897)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 379–80; Gageler, supra note 14, at 174. But see Thomson, supra note 37. 
 55. Galligan, supra note 51, at 372. Galligan notes that while federalism was a “mature and well-
tried” system of government in North America, it was new to Australians. Id. 
 56. See id. at 381.  
 57. Mason, supra note 17, at 6.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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American constitutional model, which had a good deal of influence on the 
framers’ views.58 Ultimately, the leaders of the 1897 Adelaide Convention 
“came out strongly in favor of judicial review,”59 and the framers affirmed 
their commitment to judicial review at the Convention’s final 1898 session 
in Melbourne.60  
Clearly, from the earliest days of the new Federation, constitutional 
scholars thought courts possessed “the right to declare that a law of the 
Commonwealth or of a State is void by reason of transgressing the 
Constitution.”61 Sir John Quick and Sir Robert R. Garran, writing in 1901, 
explained:  
This is a duty cast upon the courts by the very nature of the judicial 
function. The Federal Parliament and the State Parliaments are not 
sovereign bodies; they are legislatures with limited powers, and any 
law which they attempt to pass in excess of those powers is no law 
at all it is simply a nullity, entitled to no obedience. The question 
whether those powers have in any instance been exceeded is, when 
it arises in a case between parties, a purely judicial question, on 
which the courts must pronounce. This doctrine was settled in the 
United States in 1803 by the great case of Marbury v. Madison . . .62 
This 1901 reference to Marbury is not unusual. Since Federation, Chief 
Justice Marshall’s famous decision has often been invoked as a 
justification for judicial review in Australia.63 For example, in 1951, 
Justice Fullagar stated that “in [Australia’s] system the principle of 
Marbury v. Madison is accepted as axiomatic . . . .”64 This is not to say 
that Australian judges are unaware of the many criticisms of Marbury.65 
However, given the long standing acceptance of Marbury’s holding, 
dwelling upon those criticisms may justifiably be viewed as futile.66 
 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. Galligan, supra note 51, at 384. 
 60. Id. at 385.  
 61. SIR JOHN QUICK & SIR ROBERT R. GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 791 (1901).  
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Communist Party Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. at 262; Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 
134 C.L.R. 338, 379 (Dixon, J.) (Rich, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Mewett (1997) 191 C.L.R. 
471, 496 (Dawson, J.); Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337, 381 (Gummow and 
Hayne, JJ.); Att’y Gen. (W. Austl.) v. Marquet (2003) 217 C.L.R. 545, 570 (Gleeson, C.J., Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon, JJ.). 
 64. Communist Party Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. at 262. 
 65. See, e.g., Harris v. Caladine (1991) 172 C.L.R. 84, 134–35 (Toohey, J.). 
 66. See, e.g., id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/4
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The High Court has also relied on the nature of federalism in 
contending that the power of judicial review comprises a necessary part of 
Australia’s constitutional structure.67 Thus, in Boilermakers68 a majority 
stated:  
In a federal form of government a part is necessarily assigned to the 
judicature which places it in a position unknown in a unitary system 
or under a flexible constitution where Parliament is supreme. A 
federal constitution must be rigid. The government it establishes 
must be one of defined powers; within those powers it must be 
paramount, but it must be incompetent to go beyond them. The 
conception of independent governments existing in the one area and 
exercising powers in different fields of action carefully defined by 
law could not be carried into practical effect unless the ultimate 
responsibility of deciding upon the limits of the respective powers 
of the government were placed in the federal judicature.69 
Indeed, the notion that federalism necessarily requires judicial review 
has become as axiomatic in the Australian constitutional system as the 
acceptance of Marbury. However, while federalism might be seen as 
requiring the creation of an institution empowered to adjudicate between 
the federal and state governments,70 federalism certainly does not 
require—as a necessary matter—rights-based judicial review. Moreover, 
even accepting that federalism requires an institution to adjudicate 
between federal and state governments, the question remains as to why 
that institution should be a court. 
Despite the absence of an express constitutional provision conferring 
the power of judicial review, Federation judges and scholars have largely 
accepted that Australian courts, including the High Court, possess such a 
power.71 Before turning to consider how the High Court has exercised its 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., The Queen v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Soc’y of Austl. (Boilermakers) (1956) 
94 C.L.R. 254, 267–68 (Dixon, C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar, and Kitto, JJ.).  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. This excerpt is cited with approval in Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. at 
379 (Gibbs, J.). 
 70. See, e.g., Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511, 569 (Gummow and Hayne, 
JJ.). In outlining the basis of the judicial review power, Chief Justice Gleeson also considers it relevant 
that written constitutions are usually difficult to amend. See Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, Legality-
Spirit and Principle: The Second Magna Carta Lecture (Nov. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_20nov.html (discussing implied rights in the Australian 
Constitution). See also P.H. LANE, A MANUAL OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (4th ed. 
1987) [hereinafter LANE]. 
 71. To American constitutional scholars this fact must seem remarkable, given the enormous 
amount of jurisprudential interest in judicial review in the United States. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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power, however, it is useful to outline the operation of judicial review in 
Australia.  
C. The Operation of Australian Judicial Review 
As a preliminary issue, in Australia, the power of judicial review does 
not reside exclusively with the High Court. Instead, lower courts also 
possess and exercise the power to decide constitutional questions.72 
However, the High Court is the focus of attention regarding judicial 
review because it stands at the apex of Australia’s judicial system, 
deciding the most important constitutional cases.73  
Unlike some constitutional courts, the High Court does not exercise its 
power through any special referral mechanism.74 Rather, constitutional 
questions come before the High Court in the form of cases instituted by 
parties that, as part of the litigation, request the court to review the validity 
of federal, state, and territorial legislation.75 The party bringing the action 
must have standing.76 A case may be initiated in a lower court and 
removed to the High Court,77 or may be determined by a lower court and 
then appealed to the High Court.78 Alternatively, a case may be initiated in 
the High Court based on its original jurisdiction.79 When a party with the 
appropriate standing challenges the validity of legislation, the High Court 
“not only may declare acts of the Parliament to be void but . . . is under a 
duty to do so.”80  
Additionally, there is no overt deference to legislative judgments about 
constitutionality because the High Court determines “for itself any facts on 
which constitutional validity depends.”81 Thus, as Sir Anthony Mason 
 
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture: The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the 
Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH & LEE L. REV. 787 (1999).  
 72. Brian Opeskin, Australian Constitutional Law in a Global Era, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 171, 177–78 (Robert French et al. eds., 2003).  
 73. Id. at 178. In the United States, as in the Australian system, all courts may also exercise the 
judicial review power, whereas in countries such as France and Germany a single judicial body is 
granted exclusive power to invalidate legislation. Ackerman, supra note 22, at 668 n.75.  
 74. See LANE, supra note 70, at 16–17. 
 75. See id.  
 76. Id. at 29–30. 
 77. Judiciary Act § 40 (1903) (Austl.). 
 78. AUSTL. CONST. § 73(ii); see also Judiciary Act §§ 35, 35AA (1903) (Austl.); Federal Court 
of Australia Act § 33 (1976) (Austl.); Family Law Act § 95 (1975) (Austl.). See LANE, supra note 70, 
at 16–17. 
 79. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 75, 76; Judiciary Act § 30 (1903) (Austl.); See LANE, supra note 70, at 
16–17. 
 80. Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. at 364 (Barwick, C.J.). 
 81. Mason, supra note 17, at 6. See also In the Marriage of Cormick (1984) 156 C.L.R. at 177 
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aptly points out, “the federal government does not argue for a presumption 
of constitutionality” and the Federal Parliament (in contrast to the U.S. 
Congress) neither makes legislative findings on issues of constitutionality 
nor includes such findings in legislation.82 It must be kept in mind, 
however, that in some particular areas of its constitutional jurisprudence 
the High Court gives the federal legislature a large degree of discretion in 
choosing the means by which to achieve a legislative purpose, which is 
itself within the legislature’s power.83 
Finally, as to the effect of a statute being declared unconstitutional, it 
has long been accepted that an unconstitutional statute “is not and never 
has been a law at all. . . . [I]t is invalid ab initio.”84  
Having outlined the various arguments about the source of the judicial 
review power, and its operation in Australia, this Article next examines the 
High Court’s exercise of its judicial review power. 
II. THE HIGH COURT’S EXERCISE OF ITS JUDICIAL REVIEW POWER 
In discussing how the High Court exercises its judicial review power, 
this Article examines three phases of the High Court. First, the High 
Court’s formative years are considered, focusing on how the Court came 
to develop its legalistic approach to judicial review. This approach would 
dominate the Court from 1903 until 1987, when Sir Anthony Mason 
became Chief Justice.85 
Second, this Article examines the Mason Court (1987–1995). Under 
Chief Justice Mason’s influence, the High Court broke with its traditional 
approach to judicial review, adopting a more radical view of how its 
power should be exercised.86 Focusing on major cases, this section will 
illustrate the Mason Court’s style.  
Lastly, this Part considers the approach taken by the Gleeson Court 
(1998–present) in the post-Mason era. This Article argues that the Gleeson 
 
 
(Gibbs, C.J.). 
 82. Mason, supra note 17, at 6–7. On whether a presumption of constitutionality should play a 
role in Australian constitutional law, see Henry Burmester, The Presumption of Constitutionality, 13 
FED. L. REV. 277 (1983). 
 83. Mason, supra note 17, at 7. 
 84. LANE’S COMMENTARY, supra note 37, at 194 (citing Ex rel McKellar v. Commonwealth 
(1977) 139 C.L.R. 527, 550, 560 (Gibbs, J.); Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R. at 361 
(Barwick, C.J.); Cormack v. Cope (1974) 131 C.L.R. 432, 464–65 (Barwick, C.J.); S. Austl. v. 
Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373, 408 (Latham, C.J.)). 
 85. Kristen Walker, Mason, Anthony Frank, in OXFORD COMPANION 459 (Tony Blackshield et 
al. eds., 2001).  
 86. See id. at 460.  
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Court has largely and successfully endeavored to retreat from the Mason 
Court’s style, returning to a more legalistic approach to exercising judicial 
review. However, this Part also shows that the Gleeson Court’s work is 
more complex than the label “legalistic” suggests. 
A. The Formative Years: Development of the High Court’s Approach to 
Judicial Review 
The formative years of the High Court marked the development of its 
legalistic approach to judicial review.87 Separating this era into two 
distinct halves, this section addresses the High Court’s early years (1903–
1919), and the subsequent consolidation of the legalistic approach under 
Chief Justice Dixon (1952–1964). 
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by a “legalistic” 
approach to constitutional decision making. Gageler describes the High 
Court’s constitutional legalism as having two elements.88 First, its 
constitutional legalism assumes that “federalism necessarily requires the 
Court to play a unique role in determining the constitutionality of 
governmental action.”89 Second, the judiciary’s role consists of no more 
than interpreting and enforcing limitations on government power 
embodied in the Constitution’s text.90  
To understand this second element, it is important to emphasize that 
Australian legalism is deeply rooted in the English common law tradition. 
Thus, it is rule–driven, precedent-focused, and greatly prizes certainty in 
the law.91 Moreover, questions of policy and matters of politics are 
considered best left to legislators: judges must only apply the law.92 
Australia’s most influential proponent of legalism, Sir Owen Dixon, 
strenuously advocated the application of the common law method to the 
interpretation of the Constitution.93 In doing so, he adopted Sir James 
Parke’s (later Baron Parke) classic description of common law 
methodology.94 This description gives useful background regarding the 
development of Australian constitutional legalism: 
 
 
 87. See id.  
 88. Gageler, supra note 14, at 175.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. See Sir Daryl Dawson & Mark Nicholls, Sir Owen Dixon and Judicial Method, 15 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 543, 544–45 (1986). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 545. 
 94. See Owen Dixon, Concerning Judicial Method, in JESTING PILATE 152, 159 (2d ed. 1997). 
See also Dawson & Nicholls, supra note 91, at 545.  
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[The English] common law system consists in the applying to new 
combinations of circumstances those rules of law which we derive 
from legal principles and judicial precedents; and for the sake of 
attaining uniformity, consistency, and certainty, we must apply 
those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable and 
inconvenient, to all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty to 
reject them . . . because we think that the rules are not as convenient 
and reasonable as ourselves could have devised.95 
Australian judges largely seem to embrace, rather than shy away from, 
this description.96 For example, in his frequently cited address upon being 
sworn in as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Dixon stated, “it 
may be that the Court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should be 
sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide to 
judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete legalism.”97 
In examining the development of the High Court’s legalistic approach, 
and in particular how that approach related to the High Court’s exercise of 
its judicial review power, the primary focus of this Article is on Sir 
Samuel Griffith’s tenure as Chief Justice (1903–1919).98 This period has 
been described as mostly “years of strict and complete legalism.”99  
However, in its earliest constitutional law decisions,100 the approach of 
the High Court, consisting at the time of Chief Justice Griffith, and 
Justices Barton and O’Connor, does not appear overly legalistic. For 
example, in D’Emden v. Pedder,101 which concerned whether a state law 
could interfere with a federal agency or instrumentality, Chief Justice 
Griffith indicated that “in considering the validity of legislation under the 
Constitution, the substance and not the form of the legislation is to be 
regarded . . . .”102 In this case, the Chief Justice also indicated the Court’s 
approach to interpreting federal grants of legislative power under the 
 
 
 95. Mirehouse v. Rennell (1833), 1 Cl. & F. 527, 546; 6 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1023 (Eng.). 
 96. See, e.g., Owen Dixon, Upon Taking the Oath of Office as Chief Justice, in JESTING PILATE, 
supra note 94, at 249. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Anthony Mason, Griffith Court, in OXFORD COMPANION 311 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 
2001).  
 99. Justice Michael Kirby, Sir Anthony Mason Lecture 1996: A. F. Mason—From Trigwell to 
Teoh, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 1087, 1093 (1996).  
 100. The first bench of the High Court could not be appointed until the enactment of the Judiciary 
Act (1903) (Austl.). The High Court first convened on October 6, 1903. High Court of Australia—
About the High Court—History of the High Court, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about_02.html (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 101. (1904) 1 C.L.R. 91. 
 102. Id. at 108 (Griffith, C.J.). 
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Constitution:103 “[W]here any power or control is expressly granted, there 
is included in the grant, to the full extent of the capacity of the grantor . . . 
every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant 
itself ineffective.”104 Among the earliest cases outlining the first High 
Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation, these statements are not 
those of a strict legalist. 
Similarly, in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Commonwealth,105 a case 
decided two months after D’Emden, Justice O’Connor outlined very 
clearly an approach to constitutional interpretation not confined to the 
text’s express words.106 In favoring a broad construction of the word “tax” 
in § 114 of the Constitution, Justice O’Connor stated:107  
But to get at the real meaning [the High Court] must go beyond [the 
Constitution’s words], [it] must examine the context, consider the 
Constitution as a whole, and its underlying principles and any 
circumstances which may throw light upon the object which the 
Convention had in view, when they embodied it in the 
Constitution.108 
D’Emden established two elements of the High Court’s conception of 
the Constitution which would remain central to the Court’s constitutional 
vision until 1920.109 First, the Court made clear that when “considering the 
respective powers of the Commonwealth and of the States it is essential to 
bear in mind that each is, within the ambit of its authority, a sovereign 
State.”110 Following from this, “the Commonwealth is entitled, within the 
ambit of its authority, to exercise its legislative and executive powers in 
absolute freedom, and without any interference or control whatever except 
that prescribed by the Constitution itself.”111 The effect on the States was 
clear: any legislative attempt to interfere with the federal exercise of 
constitutional powers was invalid.112 Second, D’Emden emphasized that it 
 
 
 103. Id. at 109–10.  
 104. Id. at 110. 
 105. (1904) 1 C.L.R. 208. 
 106. Id. at 238–42 (O’Connor, J.).  
 107. Id. at 238–39.  
 108. Id. at 239. 
 109. D’Emden (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 109, 117 (Griffith, C.J.).  
 110. Id. at 109. See also Municipal Council (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 231 (Griffith, C.J.). 
 111. D’Emden (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 110–11. 
 112. Id. at 111. This principle was affirmed in Deakin v. Webb (1904) 1 C.L.R. 585 [hereinafter 
Deakin]. 
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was the Court’s duty to determine the validity of federal and state 
legislation.113  
Regarding both of these elements, American jurisprudence very much 
influenced the Court. Highly influential was Chief Justice Marshall’s 
pivotal decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,114 which dealt in part with the 
“conflicting powers of the government of the Union and of its 
members.”115 Indeed, Chief Justice Griffith’s judgment for the High Court 
in D’Emden devotes over seven pages to discussing McCulloch, including 
a debate about whether constitutional decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court should be given any weight in Australian constitutional 
law.116 
D’Emden’s holding that a state legislature cannot “fetter, control, or 
interfere with, the free exercise of the legislative or executive power of the 
Commonwealth . . . unless expressly authorized by the Constitution”117 
was not based on any express provision of the Constitution. Rather, the 
limitation was implied in the Constitution.118 Thus, it is possible to argue 
that the High Court took a flexible approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Even so, the Court clearly viewed its methodology as 
orthodox, considering itself to be acting entirely within the principles of 
ordinary statutory interpretation that formed part of the English legal 
canon.119  
Interestingly, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did not 
agree.120 In Webb v. Outtrim,121 the Privy Council considered the question 
of whether a federal officer, who lived in the State of Victoria and earned 
and received his salary in Victoria, was liable to pay tax under Victorian 
income tax legislation.122 This question required the Privy Council to 
 
 
 113. D’Emden (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 117.  
 114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 115. Id. at 400. 
 116. D’Emden (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 111–18. See also Municipal Council (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 236 
(Barton, J.). It is interesting to compare these debates to recent controversy in the U.S. over the use of 
foreign domestic law and international law in U.S. constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, 
When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court 
Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006). 
 117. D’Emden (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 111 (Griffith, C.J.). 
 118. See id.  
 119. See, e.g., Municipal Council (1904) 1 C.L.R. at 239 (O’Connor, J.). For insight into the 
approach to constitutional interpretation favored by Justice Barton but discussed in the context of U.S. 
decisions, see id. at 237–38. 
 120. See Webb v. Outtrim (1906) 4 C.L.R. 356 [hereinafter Webb].  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 356–57.  
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examine the High Court’s D’Emden decision.123 The Privy Council 
disapproved of D’Emden, holding that the federal officer was liable to 
assessment under the state income tax legislation.124 The Privy Council’s 
reasons are interesting, particularly because what seems to principally 
aggrieve the Privy Council is the Court’s reliance on Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.125 Moreover, the Privy Council 
specifically took issue with the High Court’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation outlined in D’Emden.126 Specifically, their Lordships were 
“not able to acquiesce” in the High Court’s “expansion of the canon of 
interpretation . . . to consider the knowledge of those who framed the 
Constitution and their supposed preferences for this or that model which 
might have been in their minds.”127 In disapproving of D’Emden, the Privy 
Council not only gave the High Court Justices a serious rebuke, but 
delegitimized the High Court’s claim that it merely applied conventional 
English common law methods of statutory interpretation to the 
Constitution. 
The High Court responded forcefully to Webb. In Baxter v. 
Commissioners of Taxation (N.S.W.),128 Chief Justice Griffith (writing also 
for Justices Barton and O’Connor) penned what has been described as “the 
most vitriolic judgment in the Commonwealth Law Reports.”129 
Concluding that a Privy Council decision regarding the parameters of the 
Australian Constitution could not “be put any higher than a decision on 
foreign law as a question of fact,” the joint Justices held the High Court 
not bound by Webb.130 
Ultimately, however, the implied immunity doctrine did not survive, 
and with its death also came the demise of the more flexible approach to 
constitutional interpretation it supported. The High Court rejected the 
implied immunity doctrine, as well as another doctrine developed in the 
early years of the Court, the “reserved powers doctrine,” in one of its most 
famous decisions, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide 
 
 
 123. Id. at 358–60.  
 124. Id. at 361 (The Earl of Halsbury delivered their Lordships’ judgment). 
 125. See, e.g., id. at 358–60. 
 126. Id. at 360–61.  
 127. Id. at 360. 
 128. (1907) 4 C.L.R. 1087. 
 129. Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, The Centenary of the High Court: Lessons from History (Oct. 
3, 2003), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_3oct.html.  
 130. Baxter (1907) 4 C.L.R. at 1118 (Griffith, C.J., Barton and O’Connor, JJ.). Justice Isaacs also 
held Webb not binding but for different reasons. Id. at 1148 (Isaacs, J.). Justice Higgins dissented. Id. 
at 1161 (Higgins, J.). 
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Steamship Co. Ltd. (Engineers’ Case).131 It is important, however, to first 
emphasize that the approach taken in D’Emden was not wholly 
representative of the early Court’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Indeed, in other cases, the High Court demonstrated its 
unwillingness to interpret the Constitution more flexibly than conventional 
methods of statutory interpretation might otherwise allow.132  
The High Court delivered the Engineers’ Case decision in 1920.133 
Chief Justice Knox presided over the Court after becoming Chief Justice 
in 1919.134 The Engineers’ Case began when the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, a union, lodged a claim under the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act (1904) (Austl.).135 The respondents included the 
Western Australian Minister for Trading Concerns, the State Implement 
and Engineering Works, and the State Sawmills.136 Consequently, the 
question that arose regarded whether an award under the federal legislation 
could bind the State of Western Australia.137 In making his case for the 
Union, Robert Menzies, who later became Prime Minister of Australia, 
challenged the Railway Servants’ Case.138 The High Court seized this 
opportunity to reconsider the implied immunity doctrine, holding in a 
five–to–one decision that the Federal Parliament had the power to enact 
laws binding the States.139 
The High Court’s rejection of the implied immunity doctrine proved a 
critical step in the Court’s development of its approach to constitutional 
interpretation.140 In rejecting the doctrine, the High Court made clear that 
it considered the D’Emden approach erroneous and outlined its view 
regarding the correct method.141 For the Engineers’ Case Court, a 
principal difficulty with D’Emden and its ilk was the Constitution’s 
 
 
 131. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129. 
 132. See, e.g., Tas. v. Commonwealth (1904) 1 C.L.R. 329, 333, 338, 340 (Griffith, C.J.), 348 
(Barton, J.), 358 (O’Connor, J.); Federated Amalgamated Gov’t Ry. and Tramway Serv. Ass’n v. 
N.S.W. Ry. Traffic Employees Ass’n (Railway Servants Case) (1906) 4 C.L.R. 488, 534 (Griffith, 
C.J., Barton and O’Connor, JJ.).  
 133.  Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 129. Six Justices heard the case: Chief Justice Knox, 
and Justices Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy, Rich, and Starke; Justice Powers did not hear the case. Id. 
 134. Sir Adrian Knox served as Chief Justice from 1919 until 1930. Graham Fricke, Knox Court, 
in OXFORD COMPANION 403 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). 
 135. Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 131–32 (Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Rich, and Starke, JJ.).  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 132–34. See also Keven Booker & Arthur Glass, The Engineers Case, in AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 34, 40 (H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 2003).  
 139. Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 129, 140, 171. Justice Gavan Duffy dissented.  
 140. See, e.g., Booker & Glass, supra note 138, at 36, 47. 
 141. Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 145–46, 148–50 (Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Rich, and Starke, 
JJ.).  
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interpretation by reference to implications drawn from outside the 
Constitution’s text or any “acknowledged common law constitutional 
principle.”142 Thus, the joint Justices chided their predecessors for 
interpreting the Constitution by reference to an implication “formed on a 
vague, individual conception of the spirit of the compact, which is not the 
result of interpreting any specific language to be quoted, nor referable to 
any recognized principle of the common law of the Constitution.”143  
Moreover, an extremely disapproving view was taken of the early High 
Court’s reliance on decisions of the United States Supreme Court in its 
development of the implied immunities doctrine.144 For the joint Justices, 
two “cardinal features” of the Australian political system—“the common 
sovereignty of all parts of the British Empire,” and the principle of 
responsible government—fundamentally distinguished the Australian 
system from that of the United States.145 Therefore, reliance on American 
constitutional law when interpreting the Australian Constitution 
constituted “profound error.”146 Looking beyond the rhetoric, one wonders 
whether the High Court’s resistance to the use of American case law is 
really attributable to the more purposive style of constitutional 
interpretation exhibited in decisions such as McCulloch.147 
According to the Engineers’ Case, the correct approach to 
constitutional interpretation was not found in the developing jurisprudence 
of the United States, but instead by reference to the “settled rules of 
construction . . . very distinctly enunciated by the highest tribunals of the 
Empire.”148 Applying these established rules to the interpretation of the 
Australian Constitution, the joint Justices emphasized the need to give 
constitutional words their natural meaning,149 taking guidance from “the 
circumstances in which [the Constitution] was made, with knowledge of 
the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law which 
preceded it . . . .”150 In determining whether a statute exceeded a grant of 
power, the joint Justices adopted the approach taken by the Privy Council. 
Namely, affirmative grants of power should be limited only by express 
conditions or restrictions in the granting instrument itself.151 By focusing 
 
 
 142. See, e.g., id. at 145.  
 143. Id. at 145. 
 144. Id. at 145–47.  
 145. Id. at 146. 
 146. Id.  
 147. See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 148. Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 148 (Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Rich, and Starke, JJ.). 
 149. Id. at 149, 152. 
 150. Id. at 149. 
 151. Id. (approving of The Queen v. Burah, 3 App. Cas. 889, 904–05 (U.K.)). 
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upon the text’s express words and insisting that constitutional 
interpretation not draw upon extra-constitutional matters, the Engineers’ 
Case has been viewed as casting an unfavorable light on the drawing of 
constitutional implications generally.152 Applying “ordinary principles of 
construction” to the Constitution,153 the joint Justices construed the 
Constitution’s grant of legislative power to the Federal Parliament as 
plenary, but “within [] prescribed limits . . . .”154 The joint Justices held 
that federal legislative power could not be limited by reference to a 
doctrine which “finds no place” where those “ordinary principles” are 
applied.155 Therefore, the Engineers’ Case held that States were subject to 
applicable and validly enacted federal legislation.156 
The Engineers’ Case represents a seminal moment in the High Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence.157 Particularly, its affirmation of the 
application of traditional principles of statutory construction to 
constitutional interpretation has had a lasting impact on Australian 
jurisprudence.158 Development of the Australian approach to judicial 
review, however, cannot be fully understood without reference to 
Australia’s preeminent jurist, Sir Owen Dixon. 
Dixon, a forceful proponent of “strict and complete legalism”159 during 
his tenure as Chief Justice (1952–64), served to consolidate legalism as the 
Australian High Court’s dominant approach to constitutional 
interpretation.160 In advocating his brand of legalism, Dixon saw himself 
as applying the historic judicial method developed over time in the English 
courts.161 Because this method reveres “uniformity, consistency, and 
certainty,”162 the doctrine of stare decisis was of fundamental importance 
to Dixon.163 He was enormously reluctant to depart from precedent, even 
in significant constitutional cases.164  
Relevant to this Article, Dixon chose to apply the traditional common 
law method to the adjudication of constitutional cases.165 Dixon thought it 
 
 
 152. Booker & Glass, supra note 138, at 44.  
 153. Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 155 (Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Rich, and Starke JJ.). 
 154. Id. at 153. 
 155. Id. at 155. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Booker & Glass, supra note 138, at 36.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Dixon, supra note 96, at 249.  
 160. Zines, supra note 5, at 220, 222. 
 161. See Dawson & Nicholls, supra note 91, at 545. 
 162. Mirehouse (1833) 1 Cl.& F. 527, 546; 6 ER 1015, 1023 (Eng.). 
 163. Dawson & Nicholls, supra note 91, at 547–48.  
 164. Id. at 548–49. 
 165. See id. at 544–45.  
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“of particular importance that the technique of the common law should be 
applied to the construction of what he described more than once as a 
‘rigid’ Constitution, in order to maintain public confidence in the Court’s 
judgments in areas of political conflict.”166 Thus, as a general proposition, 
Dixon considered questions arising under the Constitution as not requiring 
a different judicial method than questions arising under the general law.  
An important theme emerges from the decisions previously discussed. 
From the very earliest High Court decisions to Dixon’s enunciation of the 
preferred approach to constitutional interpretation, there existed a clear 
insistence on the application of ordinary principles of statutory 
interpretation to the interpretation of the Constitution. Given that 
“[s]tatutes more readily lend themselves to a legalistic approach,”167 it is 
unsurprising that legalism became such a dominant force in Australian 
constitutional interpretation.  
However, the High Court’s application of statutory interpretation 
principles to the Constitution’s interpretation is problematic, given the 
obvious differences between them. For example, while constitutions tend 
to be broadly framed so that they can be judicially adapted over time, 
statutes generally use more specific language and are usually tailored to 
deal with a narrower set of issues or circumstances.168 Why did the Court 
not instead develop different principles of constitutional interpretation 
which took into account the Constitution’s unique purpose and 
characteristics? One possible answer, that will not be explored here, is that 
the Court invoked statutory interpretation methodology—an established 
part of English common law—as a way to legitimize its constitutional 
interpretation.  
1. Section 117 of the Australian Constitution  
A salient example of the early Court’s legalistic approach to the 
exercise of judicial review is its interpretation of section 117 of the 
Constitution. This provision provides that, “[a] subject of the Queen, 
resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any 
disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him 
if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.”169 
 
 
 166. Id. at 545. 
 167. Mason, supra note 17, at 5. 
 168. Id. 
 169. AUSTL. CONST. § 117. 
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Clearly, section 117’s object is to prohibit States from imposing a 
disability upon or discriminating against a person by virtue of that 
person’s residency in a different State.170 Moreover, section 117 is 
distinctive because, unlike other express rights provisions in the 
Constitution, it directly confers an individual right.171 Specifically, it gives 
persons an immunity from laws falling within the provision’s terms.172 
However, the early High Court adopted a legalistic interpretation of 
section 117 which greatly narrowed its scope.173 For example, Davies and 
Jones v. Western Australia,174 a 1904 Griffith Court decision, held that 
while section 117 applied to prohibit legislation which discriminated 
solely on the basis of residence, it did not preclude discrimination based 
on residence and some other factor, such as domicile.175 Lee Fay v. 
Vincent,176 decided in 1908, confirmed the Court’s legalistic approach to 
section 117. Lee Fay concerned a prosecution in Western Australia for a 
breach of section 46 of the Factories Act (1904) (W. Austl.), which 
provided that “no person of the Chinese or other Asiatic race shall be 
employed in a factory unless the employer satisfies the inspector that such 
person was so employed or engaged on or immediately before 1st 
November 1903.”177 Before that date, the appellant worked in a factory in 
Victoria, a different state.178 An argument was made that if the word 
“factory” in section 46 did not include factories outside Western Australia, 
it was invalid under section 117 of the Constitution.179 The Court 
immediately dismissed the argument, viewing section 117 as only 
applying to a resident of one State seeking to assert rights in another.180 
Because the appellant was a resident of Western Australia trying to assert 
rights in Western Australia,181 section 117 did not apply.182 Although the 
High Court’s interpretation of section 117 in Lee Fay is clearly made on 
the basis of section 117’s text, this interpretation fails to take into account 
section 117’s purpose, working to undermine the provision’s potential to 
 
 
 170. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 120. 
 171. See id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. (1904) 2 C.L.R. 29. 
 175. Id. at 42–43 (Griffith, C.J.), 46–47 (Barton, J.), 48–49, 53 (O’Connor, J.). 
 176. (1908) 7 C.L.R. 389. 
 177. Id. at 391 (Griffith, C.J.). 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 390–91.  
 180. Id. at 391–92.  
 181. Id. at 392.  
 182. Id.  
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operate as a substantial protection of individual human rights.183 Thus, as 
in Davies and Jones, the adoption of a legalistic approach in Lee Fay 
further narrowed section 117’s scope.  
These cases demonstrate how the early High Court’s insistence on 
strict legalism reduced judicial review’s potential to protect individual 
rights. However, this discussion raises a further question. Namely, in what 
kinds of cases was the High Court willing to strike down federal 
legislation? The best example from this phase of the Court’s history is its 
1951 decision in the Communist Party Case.184  
2. The Communist Party Case 
The Communist Party Case held unconstitutional the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act (1950) (Austl.), which dissolved the Communist Party and 
forfeited its property, provided means for the dissolution of affiliated 
organizations, and enabled the restriction of certain civil liberties of 
individuals with Communist associations (subject to a declaration by the 
Governor-General).185 This case has been described as one of Australian 
constitutionalism’s “greatest triumphs.”186  
By way of background, in 1940, the Australian Communist Party’s 
opposition to World War II provoked the Menzies Liberal Government to 
dissolve it under regulations subsequently held invalid.187 Despite the 
Communist Party’s decision to support the war after Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the ban was not lifted until December 18, 
1942.188 The war’s end, and the concomitant end of the alliance with the 
Soviets, “saw relations between the Communist Party and the main 
political parties revert to their more normal position of mutual enmity.”189 
Industrial unrest, involving unions led by Communist Party members, 
intensified political pressure to ban the Communist Party.190 In March 
1948, the Liberal Party, at the time the opposition party, adopted a policy 
to ban the Communist Party.191 In December 1949, the Liberal-Country 
 
 
 183. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 121–22. 
 184. (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1. 
 185. Id. at 3, 129–31 (Latham, C.J.).  
 186. Winterton, supra note 51, at 108.  
 187. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116. See 
Winterton, supra note 51, at 110. Compare Communist Party v. Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
 188. Winterton, supra note 51, at 110. Winterton writes that after coming into office on October 7, 
1941, Prime Minister John Curtin, leader of the Labor Government, lifted the ban. Id. 
 189. Id. at 111. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 112. 
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Party coalition won a national election on a platform that included banning 
the Communist Party.192 Prime Minister Menzies faced a tough battle with 
the Labor Party–controlled Senate, which resisted his proposal to ban the 
Communist Party.193 In fact, Menzies’s first attempt to pass the 
Communist Party Dissolution Bill failed.194 Menzies reintroduced the Bill 
on September 28, 1950, this time raising the prospect of double dissolution 
of the Federal Parliament under section 57 of the Constitution if the Senate 
again obstructed the Bill’s passage.195 The Labor Party, while still divided 
over the issue, ultimately allowed the Bill to pass.196  
The plaintiffs in the Communist Party Case immediately challenged 
the new Act’s constitutional validity,197 arguing that the Act was 
unsupported by any constitutional grant of power.198 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs contended the Federal Parliament’s military defense power199 
and its incidental power200 were incapable of supporting the legislation.  
After twenty-four days of argument before the High Court201 and 
almost three months of deliberation, a six-to-one majority of the Court 
invalidated the Act. Each Justice delivered a separate judgment.202 For a 
majority of the Justices, the critical issue was whether this legislation was 
sufficiently connected to the defense power to be regarded as incidental or 
ancillary to that power.203 The legislation’s particular form required a 
negative answer. Specifically, the problem with the Act’s operation, most 
succinctly described by Justice Williams, was that “[o]n the basis of an 
assertion by [the Federal] Parliament or the [Federal] Executive that 
communist bodies and communist persons are acting and are likely to act 
 
 
 192. Id. at 115. 
 193. Id. at 115–17. 
 194. Id. at 121.  
 195. Id. at 123. 
 196. Id. at 124. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Communist Party Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. at 34.  
 199. Section 51(vi) of the Australian Constitution confers legislative power on the Commonwealth 
with respect to “the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the 
control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth.” AUSTL. CONST. § 51(vi) 
See also Communist Party Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. at 34. 
 200. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxxix). See also Communist Party Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. at 34. 
 201. The length of oral argument before the High Court has now been greatly reduced. However 
oral argument is not subject to strict time limits as in the U.S. Supreme Court. David Bennett, 
Argument before the Court, in OXFORD COMPANION 31 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2001).  
 202. See Communist Party Case (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1.  
 203. See id. at 193 (Dixon, J.), 206–07 (McTiernan, J.), 226–27 (Williams, J.), 243 (Webb, J.), 
278 (Kitto, J.). Justice Fullagar took a slightly different approach in this regard. See id. at 266–67 
(Fullagar, J.). His Honor considered whether the legislation could be sustained under the “extended” or 
“secondary” aspect of the defense power, which he saw as coming into existence “by virtue of a 
judicially noticed emergency.” Id. 
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in a manner prejudicial to security and defen[s]e the Act proceeds to 
dissolve these bodies and deprive communists of certain contractual 
rights.”204 For the majority, the fact that the legislation’s operation 
depended on the Federal Parliament’s “opinion that the persons to whom it 
applies are indiscriminately per se a danger,”205 rather than on “the actual 
existence or occurrence of any act, matter or thing having a specific 
relation to the purposes of the power with respect to defen[s]e,”206 was 
fatal.207 Unsurprisingly, the Court reiterated the role of judicial review 
within Australia’s legal system,208 with Justice Fullagar emphasizing that 
the constitutional limits placed on the exercise of federal legislative power 
must be finally decided by the courts, not the legislature.209  
The Communist Party Case210 is the clearest expression in Australian 
jurisprudence of the judiciary’s willingness to assert its supremacy over 
the Federal Parliament in the determination of the constitutionality of 
legislation. For that reason it arguably deserves description as “probably 
the most important [decision] ever rendered by the High Court.”211 
There is no doubt that in some contexts, such as section 117’s 
interpretation, the High Court’s legalistic approach to judicial review 
reduced the ability of the Court to rigorously enforce the Constitution’s 
rights-protective provisions. Nevertheless, the Communist Party Case212 
demonstrates the High Court’s deep commitment to the rule of law and its 
willingness to invalidate legislation, even in very politically charged 
circumstances, if it concludes that the legislature has overstepped the 
boundaries of its constitutional authority.  
Having considered the development and consolidation of the High 
Court’s legalism, the next section considers a different approach to the 
Court’s constitutional work: that of the Mason Court.  
 
 
 204. See id. at 225 (Williams, J.). 
 205. Id. at 206 (McTiernan, J.). 
 206. Id. at 200 (Dixon, J).  
 207. See id. at 193–200 (Dixon, J.), 206–07, 212 (McTiernan, J.), 225–27 (Williams, J.), 244–45 
(Webb, J.), 277–83 (Kitto, J.). 
 208. Id. at 262–63 (Fullagar, J.). 
 209. Id.  
 210. See generally id. 
 211. Winterton, supra note 51, at 129. Winterton points to the Communist Party Case’s 
“confirmation of fundamental constitutional principles such as the rule of law, its impact on civil 
liberties, its symbolic importance as a reaffirmation of judicial independence, and its political impact.” 
Id. 
 212. (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1.  
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B. The Mason Court 
The High Court entered a new phase under Sir Anthony Mason, Chief 
Justice from 1987 to 1995.213 The Justices who served with Mason were 
Justice Wilson, who retired in February 1989,214 and Justices Brennan, 
Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh (who replaced Justice 
Wilson).215 Lasting nearly a decade, and described as “among the most 
exciting and important in the Court’s history,”216 this period was a time of 
significant change for Australian law, particularly Australian constitutional 
law.217 It was also a time characterized by controversy over many of the 
High Court’s decisions.218 
Diverging from previous High Courts, the Mason Court’s approach to 
constitutional adjudication possessed several important distinguishing 
characteristics.219 For example, the Mason Court decidedly favored 
substance over form.220 The Court placed more importance on the purpose 
of constitutional provisions,221 often resulting in an increased reliance on 
historical material.222 Moreover, the Mason Court was more open to 
questioning English precedent223 and demonstrated greater willingness to 
consider questions of policy.224  
Cole v. Whitfield225 exemplifies this purposive approach and 
willingness to question precedent. In Cole, one of the Mason Court’s most 
significant constitutional decisions, the defendants were charged with 
 
 
 213. Michelle Dillon & John Doyle, Mason Court, in OXFORD COMPANION 459–60 (Tony 
Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). Mason served as a Justice of the High Court from 1972–1987. During 
Mason’s early years on the Court he pursued a more orthodox judicial approach. Kirby, supra note 99, 
at 1089–91.  
 214. Dillon & Doyle, supra note 213, at 461. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Michael Lavarch, The Court, the Parliament and the Executive, in COURTS OF FINAL 
JURISDICTION, supra note 6, at 15. 
 217. E.g., Kirby, supra note 99, at 1088. 
 218. See id. at 1087–88.  
 219. Cheryl Saunders, The Mason Court in Context, in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION, supra 
note 6, at 3. But cf. Justice Michael McHugh, The Inaugural Sir Anthony Mason Lecture in 
Constitutional Law, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989–2004 9, 29 (Nov. 26, 
2004), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/news/docs_pdfs_images/2004/MasonLecture2004.pdf.  
 220. For example, in Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360, 407–08 (the Court), the Mason 
Court emphasized that it would look beyond a statute’s form and consider its effect when determining 
whether the statute infringed section 92 of the Constitution. See also Saunders, supra note 219, at 3; 
McHugh, supra note 219, at 31. 
 221. Leslie Zines, Sir Anthony Mason, 28 FED. L. REV. 171, 174 (2000) [hereinafter Zines II].  
 222. Dillon & Doyle, supra note 213, at 462. 
 223. Id.; McHugh, supra note 219, at 32. See also Saunders, supra note 219, at 3. 
 224. Zines II, supra note 221, at 174; McHugh, supra note 219, at 32. 
 225. (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 281 Foley book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
306 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:281 
 
 
 
 
possession of undersized crayfish in violation of Tasmanian Sea Fisheries 
Regulations.226 However, the crayfish, brought from South Australia to 
Tasmania in the course of interstate trade, were not considered undersized 
under the relevant South Australian Regulations.227 In pleading not guilty, 
the defendants relied upon section 92 of the Australian Constitution, which 
provides that, “[o]n the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, 
commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal 
carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.”228  
Over the years, the Court had shifted “uneasily between one 
interpretation and another” of section 92.229 Rather than reconcile the 
precedents, a unanimous Court in Cole took a fresh look at section 92, 
adopting a dramatically different interpretation based on the Court’s 
understanding of the provision’s purpose.230 The Court held section 92’s 
purpose was to create “a free trade area throughout the Commonwealth,” 
and to deny both federal and state parliaments the “power to prevent or 
obstruct the free movement of people, goods and communications across 
State boundaries.”231 In ascertaining this purpose, the Mason Court relied 
on section 92’s history, delving into the political climate which prevailed 
prior to the Constitutional Conventions and giving detailed consideration 
to the Convention Debates.232  
Considered by some to be a more “creative” High Court,233 the Mason 
Court certainly used more “open-ended” concepts in its constitutional 
interpretation,234 and was more willing to refer to foreign case law and 
consider developments in international law in its decision making.235  
While the above paragraphs highlight the differences in the Mason 
Court’s judicial method, the Mason Court also differed from its 
predecessors in its focus.236 In the period immediately prior to Mason’s 
1987 appointment as Chief Justice, the Court handed down a number of 
 
 
 226. Id. at 361–62. The defendants were charged with contravention of Regulations 31(1)(d)(ix) 
and (x) and 44(3) of the Sea Fisheries Regulations (1962) (Tas.). Id. 
 227. See id. at 362–63.  
 228. AUSTL. CONST. § 92.  
 229. Cole (1988) 165 C.L.R. at 384 (the Court). 
 230. See id. at 385, 391–92, 403–04, 407. 
 231. Id. at 391. 
 232. Id. at 385–93. 
 233. Dillon & Doyle, supra note 213, at 462. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See generally Mabo v. Queensl. II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 
C.L.R. 292; Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273; Saunders, 
supra note 219, at 3; Dillon & Doyle, supra note 213, at 462. 
 236. See Lavarch, supra note 216, at 15–16.  
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significant decisions expanding federal legislative power.237 Against this 
background, the Mason Court turned its gaze from federalism concerns to 
a very different field, namely, the protection of individuals under the 
Australian Constitution.238 For this reason, the Mason Court has been 
credited with dramatically altering the way in which the Australian 
Constitution is conceived.239 Indeed, the Mason Court era was heralded as 
a “new constitutional law of individual (citizens’) rights that is profound 
and far-reaching.”240 
In considering the Mason Court’s development of constitutional rights 
and freedoms jurisprudence, two prominent examples ought to be 
examined. First, the Court’s reconsideration of section 117, the 
“discrimination based on state residence” provision.241 Second, the Court’s 
work in the context of implied rights and freedoms, particularly its 
recognition of the implied freedom of political communication. 
1. Section 117 of the Constitution  
As discussed, in 1904 the High Court adopted a narrow interpretation 
of section 117 of the Constitution, dramatically reducing its constitutional 
protection for individuals.242 The Barwick Court maintained the narrow 
interpretation in Henry v. Boehm,243 which by majority held that section 
117 did not prohibit the imposition of a residency requirement upon 
persons seeking admission to practice law in South Australia who were 
admitted to practice in other states.244 However, in 1989 the Mason Court 
overruled Henry v. Boehm in a decision which breathed new life into 
section 117 and demonstrated the Mason Court’s dramatically different 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  
 
 
 237. See, e.g., Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168; Commonwealth v. Tas. 
(Tasmania Dams Case) (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1. 
 238. Dillon & Doyle, supra note 213, at 462. 
 239. Lavarch, supra note 216, at 16. See generally M.J. Detmold, The New Constitutional Law, 16 
SYDNEY L. REV. 228, 228 (1994). 
 240. Detmold, supra note 239, at 228, 230. It should be noted, however, that much of the Court’s 
“rights-protective” work occurred through the development of the common law without reliance on 
express constitutional rights provisions. See, e.g., Mabo (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; Dietrich (1992) 177 
C.L.R. 292.  
 241. AUSTL. CONST. § 117.  
 242. See text accompanying notes 169–84.  
 243. (1973) 128 C.L.R. 482. 
 244. Id. at 489–90 (Barwick, C.J.) (McTiernan, J., agreeing), 493–94 (Menzies, J.), 497–98 
(Gibbs, J.). Justice Stephen dissented. 
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Like Henry v. Boehm, Street v. Queensland Bar Association245 also 
dealt with requirements for admission to practice law, namely, the 
Queensland Rules of Court (Queensland Rules). The Queensland Rules 
imposed requirements and conditions on out-of-state barristers wanting to 
practice law in the State of Queensland.246 Mr. Street, a New South Wales 
barrister,247 was refused admission to practice in Queensland because he 
failed to comply with two requirements of the Queensland Rules: first, that 
he be a resident of Queensland; and second, that he cease practicing law in 
Queensland.248 Street challenged the validity of the Queensland Rules, 
contending they violated sections 92 and 117 of the Constitution. Prior to 
the matter coming before the High Court, the Queensland Rules were 
amended to require that an applicant state that he or she intended to 
“practice principally” in Queensland and imposing a one year period of 
conditional admission on out-of-state applicants.249 The High Court 
unanimously upheld Street’s challenge to the Queensland Rules (in both 
their original and amended forms) based on section 117, overruling Henry 
v. Boehm and rejecting the narrow interpretation of section 117.  
Chief Justice Mason, drawing an analogy between section 117 and the 
United States Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause,250 referred 
to the Australian framers’ awareness of “the need for a provision which, 
by guaranteeing to out-of-State residents who were British subjects an 
individual right to non-discriminatory treatment, would bring into 
existence a national unity and a national sense of identity transcending 
colonial and State loyalties.”251 Justice Deane spoke of the early High 
Court’s tendency to “distort the content of some of [the Constitution’s] 
guarantees by restrictive legalism or by recourse to artificial formalism”252 
and considered previous section 117 decisions to constitute “a triumph of 
form over substance.”253 Each Justice emphasized that section 117’s 
protection must extend to laws which, although not necessarily facially 
 
 
 245. (1989) 168 C.L.R. 461.  
 246. Rule 38(d) of the Rules Relating to the Admission of Barristers of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland required out-of-state barristers wishing to practice in Queensland to sign an affidavit 
swearing that they had ceased to practice as a barrister in the courts to which they were previously 
admitted, and state the day on which they “arrived” in Queensland. Id. 
 247. Street was a resident of New South Wales and was admitted to practice as a barrister in New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and the Australian Capital Territory. Id. at 463. 
 248. Id. at 477 (Mason, C.J.). 
 249. Id. at 494. 
 250. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 251. Street (1989) 168 C.L.R. at 485. 
 252. Id. at 522 (Deane, J.). 
 253. Id. at 523. 
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discriminatory, produce a discriminatory impact.254 Justices Brennan, 
Gaudron, and McHugh also considered it relevant that such an 
interpretation was consistent with developments in anti-discrimination 
law.255 Thus, the judgments in Street represent a clear attempt by the 
Mason Court to break away from the legalistic approach traditionally 
taken by the High Court.256 The Mason Court in Street wanted to 
distinguish itself, particularly in the area of constitutional guarantees of 
rights and immunities. It accomplished this by adopting a more radical 
approach to constitutional decision making.257  
2. The Implied Freedom of Political Communication  
Any lingering doubts as to whether the Mason Court intended to forge 
a new and different path were obliterated by two 1992 decisions: 
Nationwide News Proprietary Ltd. v. Wills258 and Australian Capital 
Television Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth (A.C.T.V.).259 In 
simultaneous judgments, the Mason Court invalidated federal legislation 
on the basis that the legislation infringed on a newly recognized freedom 
implied into the Constitution, specifically, a freedom of communication 
about government matters. Recognition of this freedom and its 
development in Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.260 represents an 
important stage in the Court’s history and exemplifies the Mason Court’s 
approach to judicial review. 
Notably, this recognition of an implied constitutional freedom of 
communication had two important precursors.261 First, in Davis v. 
Commonwealth,262 the Mason Court invalidated part of a federal law263 
that, as part of a scheme to commemorate the bicentenary of the 1788 
European settlement of Australia, licensed the use of certain expressions 
relating to the bicentenary. The Court’s basis for invalidation was the 
familiar ground that the relevant part of the law was not “reasonably and 
 
 
 254. Id. at 487–88 (Mason, C.J.), 508 (Brennan, J.), 528 (Deane, J.), 545–46 (Dawson, J.), 554–
55, 559 (Toohey, J.), 566, 568–70 (Gaudron, J.), 581–82 (McHugh, J.). 
 255. Id. at 509–10 (Brennan, J.), 566 (Gaudron, J.), 581 (McHugh, J.). 
 256. See also id. at 527 (Deane, J.), 554 (Toohey, J.). 
 257. Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 128 (arguing that after Street, the hope that other 
constitutional rights might be reinterpreted has not yet been realized).  
 258. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1. 
 259. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106. 
 260. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520. 
 261. Detmold, supra note 239, at 231–32. 
 262. (1988) 166 C.L.R. 79. 
 263. The Court invalidated section 22(6)(d)(i) of the Australian Bicentennial Authority Act, 1980 
(Austl.) to the extent that it referred to the expression “200 years.” Id. at 101. 
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appropriately adapted” to the achievement of constitutionally permissible 
ends. However, two of the judgments contain telling references to the 
law’s “extraordinary intrusion into freedom of expression.”264  
Second, in June 1992, Justices Deane and Toohey recognized the 
existence of an implied constitutional right of equality in Leeth v. 
Commonwealth,265 with Justice Gaudron indicating a degree of sympathy 
for the idea.266 Justices Deane and Toohey suggested that the implied right 
to equality had two aspects: first, “subjection of all persons to the law;” 
and second, the “inherent theoretical equality of all persons under the law 
and before the courts.”267 Although the recognition of this implied right 
did not result in the invalidation of the federal legislation at issue,268 it 
signaled the Mason Court’s increased willingness to interpret the 
Constitution in a more “creative” or “activist” fashion. Thus, both Davis 
and Leeth provide context for the direction taken by the Mason Court in 
Nationwide News and A.C.T.V. 
Nationwide News concerned section 299(1)(d)(ii) of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1988 (Austl.) which made it an offense to use words 
“calculated . . . to bring a member of the [Australian Industrial Relations] 
Commission or the Commission into disrepute.” The appellant, the 
proprietor of The Australian newspaper, was charged with offending 
section 299(1)(d)(ii) by publishing an article critical of the Commonwealth 
“Arbitration Commission.” The article, entitled “Advance Australia 
Fascist,” described the Commission as a “Soviet-style” “corrupt and 
compliant ‘judiciary’” and labeled its members as “corrupt labour 
‘judges.’”269 The appellant’s defense challenged the validity of section 
299(1)(d)(ii), claiming it was beyond the Federal Parliament’s legislative 
powers.  
In A.C.T.V. several holders of commercial television licenses and 
license warrants under the Broadcasting Act, 1942 (Austl.) challenged the 
constitutional validity of Part IIID of the Act, which sought to ban political 
advertising during election periods and applied to federal, state, territory, 
 
 
 264. Davis (1988) 166 C.L.R. at 100 (Mason, C.J., Deane and Gaudron, JJ.), 116 (Brennan, J.). 
See also Detmold, supra note 239, at 231. 
 265. (1992) 174 C.L.R. 455, 483–93 (Deanne and Toohey, JJ.). See also Queensl. Elec. Comm’n 
v. Commonwealth (1985) 159 C.L.R. 192, 247–48 (Deane, J.); Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 
C.L.R. 1, 94–97 (Toohey, J.). See generally Wendy Lacey, Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and 
Implied Guarantees Under Chapter III of the Constitution, 31 FED. L. REV. 57 (2003). 
 266. Leeth (1992) 174 C.L.R. at 501–03 (Gaudron, J.).  
 267. Id. at 485 (Deanne and Toohey, JJ.).  
 268. Chief Justice Mason and Justices Brennan, Dawson and McHugh upheld the validity of 
section 4(1) of the Commonwealth Prisoners Act, 1967 (Austl.). Id. at 503. 
 269. Nationwide News (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 62 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.). 
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and local government authority elections, and to federal referenda. In both 
cases, the submissions challenging the federal legislation’s constitutional 
validity reveal attempts by counsel to formulate a constitutional right or 
guarantee arising out of Australia’s system of representative democracy 
and protecting the voters’ free expression regarding public or political 
matters. For example, in Nationwide News, counsel argued that in a 
representative democracy legislatures could “regulate but not abrogate 
political criticism.”270 Similarly, counsel in A.C.T.V. contended that the 
legislation contravened “an implied guarantee of freedom of access to, 
participation in, and criticism of, federal and state institutions amounting 
to a freedom of communication in relation to the political and electoral 
processes.”271 
Despite having raised these arguments, there was little hope that the 
Court would agree. Gageler, who was counsel in both cases, observed that 
“at the time there were few academics, and even fewer practicing lawyers, 
who gave the argument that the Australian Constitution contained an 
implication of freedom of speech any real prospect of success.”272 
As a result, the Court’s decision in both cases was shocking.273 In 
Nationwide News, the Court unanimously held that section 299(1)(d)(ii) 
was invalid, with four Justices recognizing an implied freedom of 
communication about governmental matters.274 A majority in A.C.T.V. 
struck down Part IIID (or at least its operative provisions) as invalid,275 
with four Justices doing so on the basis that Part IIID infringed upon a 
constitutional freedom of political or governmental communication.276 
Another Justice recognized the existence of the freedom, but did not 
invalidate the legislation on that basis.277 In two subsequent decisions, the 
 
 
 270. Id. at 8. The case was argued by J.R. Sackar Q.C., with G.O’L. Reynolds for the applicant. 
 271. A.C.T.V. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 109. The case was argued by Sir Maurice Byers Q.C., with S.J. 
Gageler, for the plaintiffs in the first action. 
 272. See Stephen Gageler, Comment on Implied Rights, in THE CAULDRON OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 83, 84 (Michael Coper & George Williams eds., 1997). 
 273. Id.  
 274. Nationwide News (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 50–52 (Brennan, J.), id. at 72–80 (Deane and Toohey, 
JJ.), id. at 94–95 (Gaudron, J.). The Court relied upon multiple grounds to invalidate the legislation. 
See generally Dean Bell et al., Implying Guarantees of Freedom into the Constitution: Nationwide 
News and Australian Capital Television, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 288 (1994).  
 275. Chief Justice Mason held the entire Part invalid, A.C.T.V. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 146–47 
(Mason, C.J.), as did Justices Deane and Toohey. Id. at 176 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.). Justice Gaudron 
held that the operative provisions of the Part were invalid in their entirety. Id. at 224 (Gaudron, J.). 
Justice McHugh held that the Part was invalid except in its application to the territories. Id. at 246 
(McHugh, J.). Justice Brennan held that the Part was valid except for sections 95D(3) and (4). Id. at 
167 (Brennan, J.). Justice Dawson dissented. Id. at 108 (Dawson, J.). 
 276. Id. at 106, 145–46 (Mason, C.J.), 171–76 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.), 214–17 (Gaudron, J.).  
 277. Id. at 149–67 (Brennan, J.). Justice McHugh saw a strong case for recognizing the implied 
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newly recognized implied freedom was held (by majority) to have 
implications for judicial development of the common law of 
defamation.278 However, the precise form and scope of the implied 
freedom remained uncertain until Lange, a unanimous High Court 
decision delivered on July 8, 1997, two years after Mason’s retirement 
from the bench.279  
Lange substantially remodeled the emerging political communication 
doctrine. The Lange Court reaffirmed the existence of a constitutional 
freedom of communication about matters of government and politics, 
describing it as “an indispensable incident” of Australia’s system of 
representative government.280 However, the Court significantly narrowed 
the scope of this freedom. The Court carefully tied the implied freedom to 
the Constitution’s text and structure,281 in particular the provisions 
requiring that members of the Federal Parliament be “directly chosen by 
the people.”282 This limited the implied freedom’s reach and restricted the 
possibility of recognizing other implied rights.  
Moreover, Lange rejected any possibility of this implied freedom 
conferring personal rights on individual persons. Rather, Lange held that 
the Constitution merely “preclude[s] the curtailment of the protected 
freedom by the exercise of legislative or executive power.”283 For this 
reason, Lange establishes a freedom from governmental interference with 
political communication and not a personal “right” to free speech. The 
distinction, which has been questioned by scholars,284 was explained by 
Justice Brennan in A.C.T.V.:  
[U]nlike freedoms conferred by a Bill of Rights in the American 
model, the freedom [of political communication] cannot be 
understood as a personal right the scope of which must be 
ascertained in order to discover what is left for legislative 
 
 
freedom, but found it unnecessary to do so in the case at hand. Id. at 233 (McHugh, J.). 
 278. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104; Stephens v. W. Austl. 
Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211.  
 279. Lange (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520. Mason retired in 1995. Walker, supra note 85, at 459. 
 280. Lange (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 559 (the Court). 
 281. Id. at 557–61 (the Court). See also Adrienne Stone, Lange, Levy and the Direction of the 
Freedom of Political Communication Under the Australian Constitution, 21 U.N.S.W. L.J. 117, 122 
(1998). 
 282. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 7, 24.  
 283. Lange (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 560. 
 284. See, e.g., Adrienne Stone, Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom 
of Political Communication, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 374 (2001). 
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regulation; rather, it is . . . an immunity consequent on a limitation 
of legislative power.285 
Importantly, in holding that this freedom is not absolute,286 the Lange 
Court formulated a test for determining the validity of communication-
burdening legislation that gave a large amount of discretion to legislatures. 
Under this test, a law would not be invalid for burdening political 
communication if its object is compatible with the maintenance of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of government, and if the law is 
“reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving that legitimate object or 
end.”287 Arguably, the test announced by the Lange Court greatly 
weakened the freedom of political communication’s potential bite.288 
Although post-Lange litigants relying on the implied freedom to 
invalidate legislative or executive action have had limited success,289 the 
Mason Court’s development of the notion of an implied right to political 
communication in Nationwide News and A.C.T.V. raised the possibility of 
a new approach to constitutional interpretation and judicial review in 
Australia, a possibility which has significance beyond the scope of 
freedom of political communication itself. The implied freedom is now an 
established part of Australia’s constitutional doctrine, which, given the 
absence of an express right to free speech in the Constitution, is 
remarkable. Moreover, the Mason Court’s development of the implied 
freedom of political communication provided the foundation for a 
different conception of Australian constitutional law, whereby the High 
Court may imply a constitutional freedom and then use this implication to 
invalidate legislative and executive actions as well as to develop the 
common law.  
 
 
 285. A.C.T.V. (1997) 177 C.L.R. at 150 (Brennan, J.). 
 286. Lange (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 561 (the Court). 
 287. Id. at 561–62. 
 288. See generally Stone, supra note 281, at 122–26. 
 289. See, e.g., Levy v. Vict. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 579 (rejecting the plaintiff’s challenge to Victorian 
legislation on grounds including that the legislation infringed the implied freedom of communication). 
See also Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1 (finding the legislation at issue not invalid, even 
though a majority of the High Court set aside certain convictions of the appellant on implied freedom 
of political communication grounds); Austl. Broad. Corp. v. Lenah Game Meats Proprietary Ltd. 
(2001) 208 C.L.R. 199 (revealing that only Justices Kirby and Callinan considered an argument that 
Tasmanian legislation authorizing the granting of an injunction was inconsistent with the implied 
freedom of communication). 
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3. Conclusion 
The Mason Court marked a new era of constitutional decision-making 
in the High Court of Australia. By rejecting the legalistic approach which 
characterized the High Court’s earlier jurisprudence, the Mason Court 
created new possibilities for Australian constitutional adjudication, 
including the rise of constitutional rights and freedoms jurisprudence, 
specifically recognizing an implied freedom of political communication.  
The Mason Court’s new direction did not go unnoticed. For example, 
media interest in the High Court’s work increased towards the end of 
Chief Justice Mason’s tenure on the Court.290 In fact, one scholar notes 
that “during this period, decision-making by the Court became 
increasingly controversial and the legitimacy of the Court was increasingly 
subject to challenge.”291 Part of the increased public interest in the High 
Court was due to Chief Justice Mason’s view, somewhat unusual in 
Australia, that it was important for judges to improve public awareness of 
the judiciary, exemplified in his public speeches about the High Court’s 
work.292  
Before considering the High Court in the post-Mason era, it is useful to 
briefly consider some of the factors that may have influenced the Mason 
Court to challenge the accepted wisdom of Australian constitutional 
law.293  
First, Mason’s ascent to the position of Chief Justice occurred shortly 
after Australia took an important step towards independence from the 
United Kingdom.294 The passage of the Australia Acts, 1986 (Austl.) and 
(U.K.), by abolishing the last avenues for appeals to the Privy Council, 
finally established the High Court’s position as Australia’s ultimate court 
of appeal.  
Second, the Mason Court operated during a time of significant social, 
economic, and political change in Australia. There was increasing 
awareness of Australia’s need to become active in the international 
community. Australia was becoming part of the global economy, which 
carried with it pressure for Australia to become a better economic 
performer in the international market.295 Australia, particularly during 
 
 
 290. Kirby, supra note 99, at 1088. 
 291. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 74. 
 292. Brennan, supra note 6, at 13.  
 293. See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 99, at 1092–1101.  
 294. COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
 295. Id. at 2. 
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Keating’s Labor Government, attempted to become more integrated within 
the Asia-Pacific region.296  
Finally, there was a heightened interest in (and concern about) 
international law and international law-making institutions,297 including 
whether and how international law might impact Australian law.298 Thus, 
the Whitlam Labor Government enacted the Racial Discrimination Act, 
1975 (Austl.) and ratified and brought into force three international human 
rights treaties.299 The Fraser Liberal-Country Government ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980.300 As 
Saunders points out, a number of significant constitutional decisions of the 
Mason Court reflected this growing interest in international law.301 
Although beyond the scope of this Article, the question of how these and 
other factors may have influenced the Mason Court warrants further 
inquiry. 
Having considered the different direction pioneered by the Mason 
Court with respect to its constitutional decision-making, this Article now 
turns to the third and final phase of the Court considered here: the Gleeson 
Court. 
C. The Gleeson Court 
This section addresses the High Court’s approach to judicial review 
under the current Chief Justice, Murray Gleeson, who was appointed in 
May 1998 and must retire at the age of seventy in 2008 unless he elects to 
do so earlier.302 When Chief Justice Gleeson was appointed, four members 
of the Court were also relatively recent appointees: Justice Gummow in 
1995, Justice Kirby in 1996, Justice Hayne in 1997, and Justice Callinan in 
February 1998.303 Two Justices, Gaudron and McHugh, were appointed 
 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 4; see also Kirby, supra note 99, at 1101. 
 298. COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION, supra note 6, at 4. 
 299. O’Neill, supra note 12, at 123. The three international treaties were: the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women; and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. 
 300. Id. 
 301. COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION, supra note 6, at 4 (citing Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273; 
Dietrich (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292; Mabo v. Queensl. (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186). See also Kirby, supra note 
99, at 1101.  
 302. Walker, supra note 9, at 305. High Court Justices cannot continue to serve past the age of 
seventy by virtue of an amendment to section 72 of the Australian Constitution made as a result of a 
1977 referendum. See Rebecca Craske, Retirement of Justices, in OXFORD COMPANION 604 (Tony 
Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). 
 303. Leslie Zines, Gleeson Court, in OXFORD COMPANION 307 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 
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considerably earlier: in 1987 and 1989, respectively. When Justice 
Gaudron retired in 2003, she was replaced by Justice Heydon. The work of 
these seven Justices, together with that of Chief Justice Gleeson, is 
considered in this Part. Although Justices McHugh and Callinan have now 
retired and have been replaced by Justices Crennan and Kiefel (in 
November 2005 and September 2007, respectively), at the time this 
Article was written, any assessment of the new appointees’ contribution 
would have been of negligible benefit. 
The Gleeson Court’s constitutional work is markedly different from 
that of the Mason Court. First, the individual rights and freedoms 
jurisprudence developed by the Mason Court has steadily declined under 
the Gleeson Court. Second, the Gleeson Court has placed greater emphasis 
on Chapter III of the Constitution and its implications for the scope of 
federal and state legislative power. This section addresses both of these 
issues and discusses one of the most important constitutional cases arising 
during the Gleeson period, Austin.304 It is contended that the Gleeson 
Court, excepting Justice Kirby, has returned to a more legalistic approach 
in the exercise of judicial review, reestablishing legalism’s dominance in 
Australian constitutional law. 
Before analyzing case law, it is important to address the Gleeson 
Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation generally. In particular, 
the different views which have emerged concerning the drawing of 
constitutional implications are considered.  
In discussing the Justices’ approaches to constitutional interpretation, it 
is unhelpful to use labels such as “originalist” or “progressivist.” Rarely 
will a Justice’s approach fit neatly into such categories. Constitutional 
interpretation is too intricate and nuanced for such simplistic 
classifications.305 Also, the originalism/progressivism debate is overstated 
in the High Court’s jurisprudence because “the relevance or otherwise of 
the framers’ intentions has been decisive in very few, if any, of the 
constitutional cases decided by the Gleeson Court.”306 However, to the 
extent such labels have some use, the Gleeson Court’s dominant approach 
to constitutional interpretation is textualism combined with a form of 
 
 
2001) [hereinafter Zines III]. 
 304. (2003) 215 C.L.R. 185.  
 305. A similar point is made by Justice Gummow in SGH Ltd. v. Comm’r of Taxation (2002) 210 
C.L.R. 51, 75. See also Justice Susan Kenny, The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2002 Term, 
26 U.N.S.W. L.J. 210, 214 (2003). 
 306. Dan Meagher, Guided by Voices?—Constitutional Interpretation on the Gleeson Court, 7 
DEAKIN L. REV. 261, 283 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/4
p 281 Foley book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] AUSTRALIAN JUDICIAL REVIEW 317 
 
 
 
 
“soft” originalism.307 The Gleeson Court’s approach is primarily textualist 
in that it tends to place considerable emphasis on the Constitution’s text 
and structure. The approach is originalist because it is considered relevant 
to ascertain the meaning attributed to constitutional provisions at the time 
the Constitution was framed.308 However, the Gleeson Court’s originalism 
is appropriately described as “soft” in that it does not attempt to answer 
questions of constitutional interpretation by ascertaining the framers’ 
subjective intentions.309 Moreover, the original understanding of a 
constitutional provision is not considered to be absolutely determinative: it 
is accepted that the interpretation of a constitutional provision can change 
over time.310 However, one member of the Gleeson Court, Justice 
Callinan, has occasionally indicated that he might favor a stricter version 
of originalism than the other Justices.311 
Justice Kirby has taken a different approach, consistently advocating 
for judges to progressively interpret the Constitution so it may be 
adaptable to changing times and values.312 In Justice Kirby’s view, “the 
Constitution is to be read according to contemporary understandings of its 
meaning, to meet, so far as the text allows, the governmental needs of the 
Australian people.”313 Importantly, however, Justice Kirby’s “progressive” 
method of constitutional interpretation does not always lead him to a 
different result than that reached by his colleagues.314  
 
 
 307. See generally Kenny, supra note 305; Meagher, supra note 306.  
 308. See, e.g., Brownlee v. The Queen (2001) 207 C.L.R. 278, 284–85 (Gleeson, C.J. and 
McHugh, J.); SGH Ltd. (2002) 210 C.L.R. at 75 (Gummow, J.).  
 309. See, e.g., Eastman v. The Queen (2000) 203 C.L.R. 1, 46 (McHugh, J.); Brownlee (2001) 207 
C.L.R. at 285 (Gleeson, C.J. and McHugh, J.). See also Meagher, supra note 306, at 283.  
 310. See, e.g., Sue v. Hill (1999) 199 C.L.R. 462, 487–90 (Gleeson C.J., Gummow and Hayne, 
JJ.), 524–28 (Gaudron, J.); Grain Pool of W. Austl. v. Commonwealth (2000) 202 C.L.R. 479, 493–97 
(Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan, JJ.). For a discussion of the High 
Court’s “moderate” originalism, see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997).  
 311. Austl. Broad. Corp. (2001) 208 C.L.R. at 331–32 (Callinan, J.), 336–37. See also Meagher, 
supra note 306, at 265, 283. 
 312. See, e.g., Abebe v. Commonwealth (1999) 197 C.L.R. 510, 581–82 (Gleeson, C.J., and 
McHugh, J.); Grain Pool (2000) 202 C.L.R. at 522–25 (Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan, JJ.); Eastman (2000) 203 C.L.R. at 79–81 (Gleeson, C.J.); A.P.L.A. Ltd. v. Legal 
Serv. Comm’r N.S.W. (2005) 224 C.L.R. 322, 442–43 (Kirby, J.). See generally Justice Michael 
Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship?, 24 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing whether the Australian Constitution should be read according to original 
intent or modern interpretation).  
 313. Eastman (2003) 203 C.L.R. at 80. 
 314. See, e.g., Abebe (1999) 197 C.L.R. at 510 (Gleeson, C.J., Callinan, Kirby, and McHugh, JJ.) 
(upholding the validity of sections 476(1), (2), (3), 481(1)(a), 485 and 486 of the Migration Act, 1958 
(Austl.)). Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne dissented. 
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The Gleeson Court’s approach to drawing constitutional implications is 
illustrated by A.P.L.A. Ltd. v. Legal Services Commissioner (A.P.L.A.).315 
Here, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Part 14 of the Legal 
Profession Regulation, 2002 (N.S.W.) (Part 14), prohibiting advertising of 
personal injury legal services.316 One of the grounds on which the 
plaintiffs challenged Part 14 was that it infringed upon an implication 
drawn from Chapter III of the Constitution.317 In a five-to-two decision, 
the Court upheld Part 14.318 The judgments provide valuable insight into 
the Gleeson Court’s varying approaches to drawing constitutional 
implications.  
The strictest approach, exemplified in the joint judgment of Chief 
Justice Gleeson and Justice Heydon, and in Justice Callinan’s separate 
judgment, allows only “necessary” implications to be drawn from the 
Constitution’s text or structure.319 A less strict approach was adopted by 
Justice Gummow,320 who applied Chief Justice Mason’s A.C.T.V. 
formulation, whereby implications derived from constitutional text are 
allowed if the “relevant intention is manifested according to the accepted 
principles of interpretation,” but implications derived from constitutional 
structure must be “logically or practically necessary.”321 Similarly to 
Justice Gummow, Justice Hayne also relied on Chief Justice Mason’s 
A.C.T.V. judgment, emphasizing that “any implication must be securely 
based.”322 However, Justice Hayne left open the question of whether 
“necessity” is always required when a judge attempts to draw a structural 
implication.323 The minority Justices, McHugh and Kirby, found for the 
plaintiffs, holding that Part 14 infringed upon an implication drawn from 
Chapter III of the Constitution (although each Justice relied on a different 
implication).324 Both minority judgments apply a looser method of 
 
 
 315. (2005) 224 C.L.R. 322.  
 316. The Legal Profession Regulation, 2002 (N.S.W.) was made under the Legal Profession Act, 
1987 (N.S.W.). 
 317. A.P.L.A. (2005) 224 C.L.R. at 326.  
 318. Id. at 345, 355 (Gleeson, C.J., and Heydon, J.), 412 (Gummow, J.) 463 (Hayne, J.), 489–90 
(Callinan, J.). Justices McHugh and Kirby dissented. 
 319. Id. at 352 (Gleeson, C.J. and Heydon, J.), 484–85 (Callinan, J.). 
 320. Id. at 409 (Gummow, J.). 
 321. A.C.T.V. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 135. This was adopted by Chief Justice Brennan in McGinty v. 
W. Austl. (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 168–69, and applied in A.P.L.A. (2005) 224 C.L.R. at 409 
(Gummow, J.). 
 322. A.P.L.A. (2005) 224 C.L.R. at 453 (Hayne, J.) (quoting A.C.T.V. (1992) 177 C.L.R. at 134 
(Mason, C.J.)). 
 323. A.P.L.A. (2005) 224 C.L.R. at 453 (Hayne, J.). 
 324. Id. at 366–67 (McHugh, J.), 444–45 (Kirby, J.). Justice Kirby also held that Part 14 was 
invalid by virtue of section 109 of the Constitution. Id. at 437, 448. 
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drawing constitutional implications. Yet, neither judgment contains an 
express statement of the principles applied.325 
Finally, the Gleeson Court, consistent with its focus on constitutional 
text and structure, exhibits far less overt reliance on policy considerations 
than the Mason Court, indeed often expressly rejecting policy-based 
arguments.326 For example, in Re Wakim, Justices Gummow and Hayne 
disapproved of the use of “perceived convenience as a criterion of 
constitutional validity,” preferring “legal analysis and the application of 
accepted constitutional doctrine.”327 Similarly, Chief Justice Gleeson and 
Justice Heydon reiterated in A.P.L.A. “[w]e are concerned . . . not with . . . 
questions of policy, but with a legal question which is to be resolved, not 
as a matter of opinion or personal preference, but as a matter of judgment 
upon a defined issue.”328 It has been suggested, however, that the Gleeson 
Court’s rejection of a policy-based approach and its emphasis on 
constitutional text may be “more a matter of tone and style than of 
substance.”329 
1. Individual Rights & Freedoms—Decline, Stagnation or Progress? 
In the context of this Article, it is useful to consider the Gleeson 
Court’s approach to constitutional rights and freedoms in two ways. First, 
has the Court been willing to recognize any new implied rights or 
freedoms? Second, what is the Court’s attitude towards existing express 
and implied constitutional rights or freedoms? 
Answering the first question is simple. Since Chief Justice Gleeson’s 
appointment in 1998, the High Court has not recognized any new implied 
rights or freedoms. However, the trend against implying rights into the 
Constitution began before 1998. For example, although Leeth potentially 
promised a new implied constitutional right to equality,330 only five years 
later in Kruger,331 Justice Toohey was alone in recognizing the general 
equality right framed in Leeth.332  
 
 
 325. It would appear, however, that Justice Kirby believes he is doing no more than extending the 
Lange principle to protect Chapter III. Id. at 440 (Kirby, J.). 
 326. See, e.g., Zines III, supra note 303, at 307–08 (also quoting the material cited infra note 327). 
 327. Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 581–82 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.).  
 328. A.P.L.A. (2005) 224 C.L.R. at 352 (Gleeson, C.J. and Heydon, J.). 
 329. Zines III, supra note 303, at 308 (looking to Sue v. Hill (1999) 199 C.L.R. 462, and Egan v. 
Willis (1998) 195 C.L.R. 424, as examples).  
 330. Leeth (1992) 174 C.L.R. at 483–93 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.). 
 331. (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1. 
 332. It should be noted, however, that Justice Gaudron did express support for a constitutional 
guarantee of equality framed in more limited terms. Id. at 112–14. 
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Al-Kateb v. Godwin333 illustrates the Gleeson Court’s reluctance to 
develop constitutional rights-based jurisprudence. Al-Kateb involved two 
issues. First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, whether the Migration 
Act, 1958 (Austl.)334 authorized indefinite detention of “unlawful non-
citizens.” And, if so, whether those provisions were constitutionally 
invalid. In a four-to-three decision, a majority, consisting of Justices 
McHugh, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon, held that the Migration Act 
authorized and required indefinite detention of unlawful non-citizens and 
that the relevant provisions were valid.335 The majority’s approach to the 
constitutional issue in Al-Kateb is classic Gleeson Court: squarely focused 
on precedent and reluctant to develop existing constitutional law in 
different ways or to assert new principles.336 Justice McHugh devoted a 
substantial part of his judgment to rebutting Justice Kirby’s invocation of 
rules of international law to construe the Constitution337 and concluded 
that “desirable as a Bill of Rights may be, it is not to be inserted into our 
Constitution by judicial decisions drawing on international instruments 
that are not even part of the law of this country.”338 
Al-Kateb and A.P.L.A. demonstrate the Gleeson Court’s strong 
resistance to implying rights or freedoms into the Australian Constitution. 
Indeed, in 2007 the judicial movement to imply rights into the 
Constitution has virtually halted, much to the chagrin of those who saw the 
Mason Court as heralding a new era of rights-based constitutional law in 
Australia.  
The second question, which seeks to understand the Gleeson Court’s 
attitude towards constitutional rights and freedoms recognized by previous 
Courts, is more complicated. The Gleeson Court has continued to 
recognize and apply the implied freedom of political communication, but 
it has not extended the doctrine.339 Moreover, the Court has taken some 
tentative steps toward developing an implied constitutional guarantee of 
procedural due process.340 The overarching sense, however, is that the 
 
 
 333. (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562. 
 334. The relevant provisions were sections 189, 196, and 198. 
 335. Al-Kateb (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562.  
 336. Id. at 586–87, 589–95 (McHugh, J.), 645–50 (Hayne, J.) (Heydon, J. agreeing), 658–62 
(Callinan, J.). 
 337. Id. at 589–95 (McHugh, J.). Justice McHugh, however, would allow reference to 
international law rules existing prior to 1900. Id. 
 338. Id. at 594. 
 339. See, e.g., Coleman (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1. 
 340. See generally Fiona Wheeler, Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High 
Court, 32 FED. L. REV. 205 (2004). 
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Gleeson Court has a limited interest in developing existing implied 
freedoms.  
With respect to express rights, the Gleeson Court has given some 
attention to section 80 of the Constitution, which protects the right to trial 
by jury.341 However, although a number of cases have presented the 
Gleeson Court with an opportunity to provide some much needed depth to 
section 80 jurisprudence,342 the Court has chosen instead to reaffirm its 
commitment to the common law method underlying Australian 
constitutional legalism. Thus, in Cheng v. The Queen343 there are clear 
demonstrations of the Gleeson Court’s preference for incremental case law 
development, and a concomitant reluctance to decide questions which are 
not strictly necessary on the facts of the case.344  
In a different context, however, the Gleeson Court delivered a decision 
of particular importance to criminal appellants, even though the judgments 
are not framed in the language of individual rights. Crampton v. The 
Queen345 confirmed that there was no constitutional barrier preventing the 
High Court from hearing an appeal under section 73 of the Constitution on 
grounds not previously raised, although the Court would grant special 
leave only in exceptional circumstances.346 Thus, criminal appellants are 
not automatically deprived of the opportunity to raise a ground of appeal 
before the High Court because their counsel failed to raise it in earlier 
proceedings. Given Crampton, it would be wrong to assume that the 
Justices of the Gleeson Court are unconcerned with the protection of 
vulnerable persons merely because their judgments are not obviously 
informed by the discourse of individual rights. 
Although the Gleeson Court has focused less on rights-based 
constitutional law than the Mason Court,347 another field of constitutional 
law has received a good deal of attention: Chapter III. 
 
 
 341. It should be noted however, that scholars question whether section 80 is best understood as a 
“rights-protective” provision. James Stellios, The Constitutional Jury—“A Bulwark of Liberty”?, 27 
SYDNEY L. REV. 113 (2005).  
 342. Id. at 142.  
 343. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 248. 
 344. Id. at 268–70 (Gleeson, C.J., Gummow and Hayne, JJ.), 344–45 (Callinan, J.).  
 345. (2000) 206 C.L.R. 161.  
 346. Id. at 170–71 (Gleeson, C.J.), 184 (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan, JJ.), 205–06 (Kirby, J.), 
216 (Hayne, J.). Justice McHugh dissented on this issue. Id. at 188. 
 347. Wheeler, supra note 340, at 206.  
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2. Chapter III of the Constitution under the Gleeson Court  
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, like Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, deals with “The Judicature.” It establishes the High Court of 
Australia,348 including provisions for the appointment, removal, and 
remuneration of High Court Justices.349 Chapter III also contains 
provisions describing the High Court’s jurisdiction350 and dealing with the 
Federal Parliament’s powers with respect to the Court’s jurisdiction.351 
The jury trial provision, section 80, is also found in Chapter III.352 
The Gleeson Court has shown a substantial amount of interest in 
Chapter III. This section addresses some of the key developments in this 
area.353 
Historically, the separation of powers doctrine has been an important 
aspect of the High Court’s Chapter III jurisprudence. This doctrine centers 
on two related prohibitions: 
First, that federal judicial power cannot be exercised by bodies other 
than the ‘courts’ identified in section 71 of the Constitution (the 
‘first limb’ of the separation doctrine) and, secondly, that federal 
courts cannot exercise legislative or executive functions unless 
those functions are incidental to judicial power (the ‘second limb’ 
of the separation doctrine).354 
The Constitution does not expressly adopt the separation of powers 
doctrine, though it is firmly established as an implication from the 
Constitution’s text and structure.355 The Gleeson Court has been 
 
 
 348. AUSTL. CONST. § 71. 
 349. Id. § 72. 
 350. Id. §§ 73, 75. 
 351. Id. §§ 76, 77. 
 352. Id. § 80.  
 353. In addition to the cases addressed here, see Abebe (1999) 197 C.L.R. 510, an important case 
dealing with the validity of federal legislation purporting to limit the grounds upon which the Federal 
Court of Australia could examine the validity of decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The High 
Court upheld the validity of the legislation in a four-to-three decision. The majority consisted of Chief 
Justice Gleeson, and Justices McHugh, Kirby and Callinan. Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne 
dissented. Id.  
 354. Wheeler, supra note 340, at 207 (internal citations omitted). With respect to the first limb, 
Wheeler cites N.S.W. v. Commonwealth (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54 and Waterside Workers’ Fed’n of Austl. 
v. J.W. Alexander Ltd. (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434. With respect to the second limb, Wheeler cites 
Boilermakers (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254. That case was affirmed by the Privy Council in Att’y Gen. (Cth) v. 
The Queen (1957) 95 C.L.R. 529. 
 355. Wheeler, supra note 340, at 207–08. 
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particularly interested in strengthening this doctrine,356 best illustrated by 
Re Wakim.357 
At issue in Re Wakim was a national cooperative legislative scheme for 
the transfer of jurisdiction among federal, state and territory courts, 
implemented to obviate many of the “jurisdictional disputes and gaps 
which plagued litigation [in Australia] during the 1980s.”358 This “cross-
vesting scheme,” so-called because it involved the vesting of state 
jurisdiction in federal courts and courts of different States, was enacted by 
the federal and state parliaments after a plan for a unified court system 
failed.359 Re Wakim involved two related schemes. Under the first, which 
commenced in 1987, the Federal Parliament and all state parliaments 
enacted legislation to establish a cross-vesting system for general civil 
matters.360 Essentially, the federal legislation empowered the Federal 
Court, the Family Court (also a federal court), and the Territory Supreme 
Courts to exercise original or appellate jurisdiction “conferred on that 
court by a provision of this Act or of a law of a State relating to cross-
vesting of jurisdiction.”361 State legislation empowered those courts, and 
Supreme and Family Courts of other States, to “exercise original and 
appellate jurisdiction with respect to State matters,” except in criminal 
proceedings.362 Under the second scheme brought into effect during 1989 
and 1990, legislation provided specifically for the cross-vesting of 
jurisdiction with respect to corporations law and securities matters.363 The 
applicants in the Re Wakim cases challenged the validity of: first, 
provisions of the first scheme which purported to enable the Federal Court 
to hear “State matters”;364 second, provisions of the second scheme which 
purported to enable the Federal Court to exercise powers under the 
Corporations Law of a state;365 and third, provisions of the Federal 
 
 
 356. Id. 
 357. (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511.  
 358. Dung Lam, Case Note: Wakim, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 155, 156 (2000). Lam provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the jurisdictional issues prior to cross-vesting at 156–59. 
 359. Id. at 159.  
 360. In each jurisdiction the short title of the Act was the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) 
Act, 1987. The relevant provisions are set out in Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 565–66 (Gummow 
and Hayne, JJ.). 
 361. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act, 1987, § 9(2)(a) (Austl.). 
 362. Section 4 of the state Cross-Vesting Acts. 
 363. This scheme was given effect by the Corporations Act, 1989 (Austl.); the Australian 
Securities Commission Act, 1989 (Austl.); and the Corporations Act of each state. See Re Wakim, 198 
C.L.R. at 566–68 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.). 
 364. See supra note 361. 
 365. In the Re Brown; Ex parte Amann matter. 
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Corporations Act which purported to enable the Federal Court to exercise 
powers under the Corporations Law of the Australian Capital Territory.366  
The cross-vesting scheme’s constitutional validity was of concern even 
before the scheme commenced,367 with unease centering principally on 
whether the federal and state parliaments could confer state jurisdiction on 
Chapter III courts. The scheme was directly challenged in Gould v. 
Brown,368 where the Court divided three-to-three on the constitutional 
question. With the retirements of Chief Justice Brennan and Justice 
Toohey, both of whom had supported the scheme’s validity, a dark 
constitutional cloud loomed over the scheme.369 What kind of difference 
would result from the new appointments of Chief Justice Gleeson, and 
Justices Hayne and Callinan?370 
The Re Wakim cases were more clear-cut. In a six-to-one decision 
(Justice Kirby dissented), the Gleeson Court held that section 9(2) of the 
Federal Cross-Vesting Act was invalid. The majority held that the 
Constitution limited the jurisdiction that could be conferred on a federal 
court to those matters identified in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution, 
and only the Federal Parliament could confer such jurisdiction.371 In so 
holding, the majority relied upon precedents describing Chapter III as “an 
exhaustive statement” of the manner in which federal judicial power may 
be vested.372 The state jurisdiction which section 9(2) purported to confer 
was not found in sections 75 or 76 and was therefore invalidly 
conferred.373  
In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered two major arguments 
in favor of the scheme’s validity: first, that any lack of express 
constitutional authority to confer jurisdiction on federal courts could be 
 
 
 366. In Re Spinks v. Prentice (1999). 
 367. Lam, supra note 358, at 155. Lam notes that prior to the scheme’s commencement, the 
Constitutional Commission had recommended that its validity be “secured” by referendum, and refers 
to a number of scholarly articles published on the question in 1988–1989. Id. at n.2. 
 368. (1998) 193 C.L.R. 346. 
 369. Lam, supra note 358, at 155. 
 370. Justice Hayne was appointed in September 1997 in order to replace Justice Dawson, who 
retired prior to the delivery of Gould. Graeme Hill, Hayne, Kenneth Madison, in OXFORD COMPANION 
316–17 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2001). Justice Callinan’s appointment in February 1998 
(replacing Justice Toohey) was soon followed by the appointment of Chief Justice Gleeson, who 
replaced Chief Justice Brennan in May 1998. See Zines III, supra note 303, at 307. 
 371. Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 555, 557–9 (McHugh, J.), 575 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) 
(Gleeson, C.J., and Gaudron, J., agreeing), 626 (Callinan, J.). 
 372. Boilermakers (1956) 94 C.L.R. at 270 (Dixon, C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto, JJ.), cited 
in Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 575 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) (Gleeson, C.J., and Gaudron, J., 
agreeing). See also Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 557 (McHugh, J.). 
 373. Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 555, 562–3 (McHugh, J.), 582 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) 
(Gleeson, C.J., and Gaudron, J., agreeing), 625–6 (Callinan, J.). 
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overcome by enacting co-operative federal/state legislation; and second, 
that the Constitution empowered the Federal Parliament to consent to the 
States’ conferral of jurisdiction on federal courts.374 With respect to the 
first argument, the majority made it clear that “no amount of co-operation 
can supply power where none exists.”375 In short, policy-based arguments 
could not overcome a lack of constitutional authority. The second 
argument was based on the contention that the Federal Parliament was 
empowered to consent to conferral of jurisdiction under the Constitution’s 
express incidental power,376 or section 71’s implied incidental power. This 
argument was also rejected. For Chief Justice Gleeson, the conferral of 
state jurisdiction on federal courts was not made “in aid of the execution 
of the principal power,” but rather effected a “substantial addition” to 
federal judicial power, and constituted “an attempt to circumvent” 
constitutional limitations on that power.377 Similarly, Justices Gummow 
and Hayne saw the purported conferral of state jurisdiction as an attempt 
to “supplement” federal judicial power rather than an attempt to 
“complement” that power.378 Justice McHugh gave different reasons for 
rejecting the argument, explaining that although the conferral of state 
jurisdiction upon federal courts might make the exercise of state 
jurisdiction more effective, it could not make the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction more effective.379  
Re Wakim makes abundantly clear that despite strong public policy 
reasons for upholding the scheme’s validity, the Court (or at least the 
majority) was not swayed from its legalistic approach to constitutional 
decision-making. In the Gleeson Court’s view, the well-established nature 
of the scheme and the consequences of declaring it unconstitutional should 
not be treated as factors relevant to the determination of the scheme’s 
constitutionality. Moreover, the Court’s willingness to invalidate a scheme 
which had resulted from cross-polity political consensus and had been in 
place for over a decade illustrates the seriousness with which the Court 
views its constitutional role.  
 
 
 374. Id. at 556–63 (McHugh, J.) (Callinan, J. agreeing), 576–82 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) 
(Gleeson, C.J., and Gaudron, J., agreeing), 600–616 (Kirby, J.). 
 375. Id. at 556 (McHugh, J.) (Callinan, J., agreeing), 577 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) (Gleeson, 
C.J., and Gaudron, J., agreeing).  
 376. AUSTL. CONST. § 51. 
 377. Re Wakim (1999) 198 C.L.R. at 546 (Gleeson, C.J.). 
 378. Id. at 580–81 (Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) (Gleeson, C.J., and Gaudron, J., agreeing). 
 379. Id. at 562 (McHugh, J.) (Callinan, J., agreeing). 
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3. Kable and the Gleeson Court 
Another important facet of the Gleeson Court’s Chapter III work is its 
treatment of the Kable principle. Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
(N.S.W.),380 decided eighteen months prior to Gleeson’s appointment as 
Chief Justice, concerned New South Wales legislation empowering that 
State’s Supreme Court to make an order for the imprisonment of one 
named person, Gregory Wayne Kable, for a specified period of time to 
prevent him from committing future crimes.381 A majority of the High 
Court held the New South Wales legislation was unconstitutional on the 
basis of a principle, formulated differently by each Justice, derived from 
Chapter III of the Constitution. 
Justice Toohey held that a state court exercising federal jurisdiction 
(which he concluded had occurred in Kable) may not act in a manner 
“incompatible” with Chapter III.382 In Justice Toohey’s opinion, the issue 
of incompatibility arose in Kable because the state legislation directed the 
Supreme Court to act inconsistently with “traditional judicial process,” 
particularly because the legislation was aimed at one named person and 
would therefore diminish public confidence in the judiciary.383  
Justice Gummow, also emphasizing that the State Supreme Court in 
this case was exercising federal jurisdiction,384 agreed that the New South 
Wales legislation directed the Supreme Court to act in a manner 
“repugnant to judicial process.”385 Pointing out that the legislation 
required the Supreme Court to punish Kable “without any anterior finding 
of criminal guilt by application of the law to past events,” Justice 
Gummow expressed concern that the judiciary would be “seen as but an 
arm of the executive which implements the will of the legislature.”386 
Justice Gummow held that the Kable legislation attempted to impair the 
New South Wales Supreme Court in contravention of a mandate arising 
from the constitution and which operated to protect federal judicial power 
“as and when it may be invested.”387 
 
 
 380. (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51. 
 381. Community Protection Act, 1994, § 5(1) (N.S.W.). Kable’s release had become a matter of 
political and public interest due in part to threatening letters he had written while in prison, and which 
were directed to his children’s caregivers. Paul Ames Fairall, Imprisonment Without Conviction in 
New South Wales: Kable v. Director of Public Prosecution, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 573, 573–74 (1995). 
 382. Kable (1996) 189 C.L.R. at 94 (Toohey, J.). 
 383. Id. at 98.  
 384. Id. at 136 (Gummow, J.). 
 385. Id. at 134. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 143. 
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Justices Gaudron and McHugh, in separate judgments, suggested a 
more stringent limitation on state legislative power. According to Justice 
Gaudron, the integrated judicial system established by Chapter III 
prohibited state parliaments from conferring powers on state courts that 
“are repugnant to or incompatible with” the exercise of federal judicial 
power by those courts.388 The constitutional prohibition on state legislative 
conferral of incompatible functions on state courts was not restricted to the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction: “[i]f Ch III requires that State courts not 
exercise particular powers, the Parliaments of the States cannot confer 
those powers upon them.”389 In Justice Gaudron’s view, the functions the 
Kable legislation conferred on the New South Wales Supreme Court were 
so contrary to what is ordinarily involved in the judicial process that the 
“integrity of the judicial system” created by Chapter III was 
compromised.390 Similarly, Justice McHugh determined that no 
parliament—state or federal—could legislate “in a way that might 
undermine the role of [state courts] as repositories of federal judicial 
power.”391 Finding it irrelevant that the Kable legislation was aimed at the 
exercise of state jurisdiction,392 Justice McHugh held that the legislation 
infringed upon Chapter III because it would “inevitably” impair public 
confidence in the state judiciary by virtue of the fact that “ordinary 
reasonable members of the public” might perceive the Supreme Court as 
“an instrument of executive government policy.”393 
Obviously, Kable created a good deal of concern among the States. Its 
implications were potentially very broad and threatened to inhibit state 
legislative power with respect to state courts, even on purely State matters 
(especially according to Justices Gaudron and McHugh’s approach).394  
The Gleeson Court has had several opportunities to consider the 
development and application of Kable.395 For a period of time, however, 
 
 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. at 102 (Gaudron, J.). 
 390. Id. at 107. 
 391. Id. at 116 (McHugh, J.). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 124. 
 394. See generally Elizabeth Handsley, Do Hard Laws Make Bad Cases?—The High Court’s 
Decision in Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions (N.S.W.), 25 FED. L. REV. 171 (1997); Peter 
Johnston & Rohan Hardcastle, State Courts: The Limits of Kable, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 216 (1998); 
Rohan Hardcastle, A Chapter III Implication for State Courts: Kable v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 3 NEWCASTLE L. REV. 13 (1998–1999).  
 395. In addition to the cases considered in this section, see also H.A. Bachrach Proprietary Ltd. v. 
Queensl. (1998) 195 C.L.R. 547, a Kable case regarding Queensland legislation which had the effect 
of permitting a proposed land development. The Court unanimously upheld the legislation’s validity. 
Id. 
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the Court appeared reluctant to fully tackle Kable and its potential 
ramifications. For example, in McGarry v. The Queen,396 a case in which 
the appellant sought to raise a Kable challenge to the validity of Western 
Australia’s indefinite imprisonment legislation,397 the Court considered it 
unnecessary to deal with the Kable issue because the appeal was allowed 
on other non-constitutional grounds.398 Subsequently, in Silbert v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions (W. Austl.),399 the Court rejected a Kable challenge 
to Western Australia’s criminal confiscation legislation, yet gave only 
brief reasons for doing so. If the Gleeson Court was, as has been 
suggested, reluctant to confront Kable, such reluctance was entirely 
understandable. Although much of the legal reasoning in Kable appeared 
to sit uncomfortably with the Gleeson Court, the Court’s respect for 
precedent meant that overruling Kable was not really an option. Arguably 
there was only one answer: Kable would have to be narrowed.400  
A clear opportunity for the Gleeson Court to deal with Kable arose in 
Fardon v. Attorney General (Queensl.).401 Fardon concerned a 
constitutional challenge to Queensland legislation that empowered the 
Queensland Supreme Court to order terms of indefinite imprisonment for 
prisoners already serving prison terms for a “serious sexual offence.”402 
Fardon was delivered simultaneously with Baker v. The Queen,403 in 
which the Court rejected a weaker Kable challenge to legislation 
concerning the New South Wales Supreme Court’s power to make an 
indeterminate life sentence a determinate sentence. In Fardon, the 
 
 
 396. (2001) 207 C.L.R. 121. 
 397. The applicant sought to challenge the validity of section 98 of the Sentencing Act, 1995 (W. 
Austl.). 
 398. McGarry (2001) 207 C.L.R. at 124 (Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne, 
JJ.), 149–50 (Kirby, J.). Although Justice Callinan dissented on the non-constitutional question, he 
declined to address the constitutional issue. Id. at 164 (Callinan, J.). 
 399.  (2003) 217 C.L.R. 181. Silbert concerned the validity of the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) 
Act, 1988 (W. Austl.) which in this case operated to empower the court to make confiscation orders in 
relation to the estate of a person who died after being charged with, but not convicted of, serious 
crimes within the meaning of the legislation. The Court unanimously upheld the validity of the 
relevant legislative provisions. 
 400. In Baker v. The Queen (2004) 223 C.L.R. 513, 544 (Kirby, J.), Justice Kirby questioned the 
legitimacy of narrowing Kable in circumstances where it was not suggested that Kable was wrongly 
decided or in need of reconsideration. 
 401. (2004) 223 C.L.R. 575. 
 402. Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act, 2003, §§ 8, 13 (Queensl.). 
 403. (2004) 223 C.L.R. 513. The New South Wales legislation at issue in Baker provided that 
certain prisoners serving life sentences were not eligible to have their indefinite prison sentence 
effectively changed to a definite sentence unless the Supreme Court was satisfied that “special 
reasons” existed. Sentencing Act, 1989, § 13A(3A) (N.S.W.), as amended by the Sentencing 
Legislation Further Amendment Act, 1997 (N.S.W.). The Court upheld the validity of the relevant 
legislative provisions by a six-to-one majority (Justice Kirby dissented). 
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appellant’s Kable challenge was that the Queensland legislation 
contravened Chapter III of the Constitution by conferring on the Supreme 
Court of Queensland a function repugnant to the Court’s “institutional 
integrity.”404 The Kable challenge was rejected by the Court by a vote of 
six-to-one (Justice Kirby dissented).405  
For a number of reasons, it is apparent from Fardon that the majority 
Justices were intent upon narrowing Kable’s scope. First, great emphasis 
was placed on the extraordinary nature of the Kable legislation—
especially that it was ad hominem.406 In fact, the judgments of Chief 
Justice Gleeson and Justice McHugh (himself a member of the Kable 
majority) are so focused on the fact that the Kable legislation was directed 
to one named individual that one wonders whether any legislation 
applying to more than one person would contravene the principle. Justice 
McHugh is alive to this possibility, indicating that Kable was the result of 
such unusual circumstances that it was “unlikely to be repeated.”407  
Second, in a substantial constitutional victory for the States,408 the 
majority emphasized that Chapter III imposes less stringent requirements 
on state legislation purporting to confer jurisdiction and powers upon state 
courts when exercising state jurisdiction.409 Indeed, in Justice McHugh’s 
opinion, state legislation directed to state courts would be invalidated by 
Chapter III “only in very limited circumstances”—a significant shift from 
his judgment in Kable.410 Although slightly different formulations were 
used, the majority indicated that the Kable principle would only invalidate 
state legislation that purports to confer a function upon a state court that 
compromises or is incompatible with the institutional integrity of state 
courts.411  
 
 
 404. Fardon (2004) 223 C.L.R. at 586 (Gleeson, C.J.). 
 405. Id. at 593 (Gleeson, C.J.), 601–02 (McHugh, J.), 621 (Gummow, J.) (Hayne, J. agreeing), 
658 (Callinan and Heydon, JJ.). 
 406. Id. at 591 (Gleeson, C.J.), 595–96, 601 (McHugh, J.), 658 (Callinan and Heydon, JJ.). See 
also id. at 617 (Gummow, J.) (Hayne, J. agreeing). Justice Kirby takes issue with this approach in 
Baker (2004) 223 C.L.R. at 535–36. 
 407. Fardon (2004) 223 C.L.R. at 601 (McHugh, J.). 
 408. Various State Solicitors—General, on behalf of their Attorneys-General, intervened in H.A. 
Bachrach (1998) 195 C.L.R. 547, Silbert (2003) 217 C.L.R. 181, Baker (2004) 223 C.L.R. 513, and 
Fardon (2004) 223 C.L.R. 575, to argue that Kable did not apply or, to offer a narrower interpretation 
of Kable. The Commonwealth Solicitor General also intervened regularly. 
 409. Fardon (2004) 223 C.L.R. at 598 (McHugh, J.), 614 (Gummow, J.) (Hayne, J., agreeing), 
655–56 (Callinan and Heydon, JJ.). 
 410. Id. at 598 (McHugh, J.). 
 411. Id. at 591 (Gleeson, C.J.) (asking whether the function “substantially impairs [the court’s] 
institutional integrity”), 598–99 (McHugh, J.) (asking whether the legislation “compromises the 
institutional integrity of State courts and affects their capacity to exercise federal jurisdiction . . . 
impartially and competently”), 617 (Gummow, J.) (Hayne, J., agreeing) (stating that the “essential 
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In the result, each member of the majority held that the Fardon 
legislation did not purport to confer a function on the Queensland Supreme 
Court that was incompatible with that Court’s institutional integrity.412 In 
reaching this conclusion, the form of the legislation was critical, in 
particular that the State Supreme Court’s function under the legislation 
was “consistent with its judicial character” because the Court had 
substantial discretion whether to make an order and, if so, what type of 
order to make.413 Additionally, the legislation included several procedural 
safeguards, such as requiring annual reviews by the Supreme Court of 
continuing detention orders.414  
Although there remains a degree of disagreement among the majority 
Justices about how far Kable should be restricted,415 it is clear that the 
Gleeson Court has significantly narrowed the scope of the Kable 
principle—to the great relief of the States.  
4. Austin v. Commonwealth 
In Austin the Gleeson Court considered an important question: what 
power (if any) did the legislature of one polity within the Australian 
Federation possess to bind the executive government of another?416  
The pivotal Engineers’ Case rejected the implied immunities 
doctrine,417 thereby beginning a new era of constitutional interpretation 
and development in Australia. Thus, after 1920 the Federal Parliament 
could legislate to bind state executives, and vice-versa, subject to 
constitutional authority that supported the exercise of legislative power 
and also to section 109 of the Constitution. However, the Federal 
 
 
notion is that of repugnancy to or incompatibility with [the] institutional integrity of the State courts”), 
656 (Callinan and Heydon, JJ.) (asking whether the “integrity and independence as a court are . . . 
compromised”). 
 412. Id. at 592 (Gleeson, C.J.), 598 (McHugh, J.), 621 (Gummow, J.) (Hayne, J., agreeing), 658 
(Callinan and Heydon, JJ.). 
 413. Id. at 592 (Gleeson, C.J.). See also id. at 596–97 (McHugh, J.), 657–58 (Callinan and 
Heydon, JJ.). 
 414. Id. at 619–21 (Gummow, J.) (Hayne, J., agreeing), 656–58 (Callinan and Heydon, JJ.). 
 415. Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice McHugh (writing separately) and Justices Callinan and 
Heydon (in a joint judgment) seem most intent on narrowing Kable. Justice Gummow’s judgment 
suggests an inclination to allow a less narrow application of the principle, expressing the view that the 
Fardon legislation’s outcome “could not be attained in the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 614 
(Gummow, J.). Justice Hayne agreed with Justice Gummow generally but reserved his opinion on the 
federal jurisdiction question. Id. at 647–48. 
 416. Austin (2003) 215 C.L.R. 185. See also Anne Twomey, Federal Limitations on the 
Legislative Power of the States and the Commonwealth to Bind One Another, 31 FED. L. REV. 507 
(2003). 
 417. Engineers’ Case (1920) 28 C.L.R. at 155 (Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Rich and Starke, JJ.). 
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Parliament’s power to legislate with respect to the States was partially 
truncated by the High Court’s 1947 decision in Melbourne Corporation v. 
Commonwealth,418 a case in which the Court recognized an implied 
limitation on the exercise of federal legislative powers. The limitation, 
drawn from the Constitution’s federal structure, was understood419 as 
having two parts: first, “the prohibition against discrimination which 
involves the placing on the States of special burdens or disabilities”; and 
second, “the prohibition against laws of general application which operate 
to destroy or curtail the continued existence of the States or their capacity 
to function as governments.”420  
In Austin, the Gleeson Court reconsidered the Melbourne Corporation 
doctrine, reformulated the doctrine, and then applied it to invalidate 
federal taxation legislation that affected state judicial pension schemes.  
The Austin legislation is complex. By two statutes, the Superannuation 
Contributions Tax Imposition Act, 1997 (Austl.) and the Superannuation 
Contributions Tax (Assessment and Collection Act), 1997 (Austl.), the 
federal government sought to alleviate perceived inequities in the 
superannuation system by imposing a new tax on high income earners.421 
Liability to pay the new tax, labeled a “surcharge,” was imposed on the 
superannuation provider (rather than superannuation fund members) if that 
provider was the “holder” of the superannuation contributions.422  
Subsequently, in 1997, the Federal Parliament enacted legislation to 
ensure that the superannuation contributions surcharge would apply to 
“members of constitutionally protected superannuation funds.”423 The 
legislation, the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of 
Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Imposition Act, 1997 
(Austl.) (“the Imposition Act”) and the Superannuation Contributions Tax 
(Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) 
Assessment and Collection Act, 1997 (Austl.) (“the Assessment Act”), 
came into force on December 7, 1997.424 Pursuant to section 38 of the 
Assessment Act, “constitutionally protected superannuation fund” was 
given the same meaning as “constitutionally protected fund” in Part IX of 
 
 
 418. (1947) 74 C.L.R. 31. 
 419. See Twomey, supra note 416, at 509 n.20. 
 420. Queensl. Elec. Comm’n (1985) 159 C.L.R. 192, 217 (Mason, J.), quoted with approval in Re 
Austl. Educ. Union, Ex parte Vict. (1995) 184 C.L.R. 188, 231 (Mason, C.J., Brennan, Deane, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh, JJ.). 
 421. Austin (2003) 215 C.L.R. at 231–32 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.).  
 422. Section 10 of the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Assessment and Collection) Act, 1997 
(Austl.). 
 423. Austin (2003) 215 C.L.R. at 233 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.). 
 424. Id. at 235. 
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the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936 (Austl.). At that time, the Income 
Tax Regulations, 1936 (Austl.) declared certain funds to be 
“constitutionally protected funds,” including state statutory schemes which 
provided pensions and other benefits to state judges.425 
High Court proceedings were initiated by two state judicial officers 
who claimed, inter alia, that the Imposition Act and the Assessment Act 
were invalid. One question was obvious: were these Acts invalid in their 
application to the first plaintiff (a Justice of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court) “on the ground that they so discriminate against the States 
. . . or so place a particular disability or burden upon the operation and 
activities of the States, as to be beyond the [Federal Parliament’s] 
legislative power?”426 As noted by Chief Justice Gleeson, the 
constitutional limitation raised was an implied limitation, “said to result 
from the federal nature of the Constitution as a matter of necessary 
implication.”427  
In a five-to-one decision (Justice Kirby dissented), the Court held both 
federal Acts invalid in their application to the first plaintiff because they 
imposed a particular disability or burden on the operations and activities of 
New South Wales.428 Thus, the concept of “discrimination” in the context 
of intergovernmental immunities was critical to the majority’s decision. 
First, the majority dealt with the content to be given to Melbourne 
Corporation’s concept of “discrimination.” For example, was 
discrimination against a State merely “an illustration of a law impairing 
the capacity of a State to govern” or did it have “a standing of its own?”429 
In an uncharacteristic departure from precedent, the joint Justices and 
Justice Kirby rejected the “two-limb” Melbourne Corporation approach, 
preferring a single test.430 Justices Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne 
explained: 
There is . . . but one limitation, though the apparent expression of it 
varies with the form of the legislation under consideration. The 
question presented by the doctrine in any given case requires 
assessment of the impact of particular [federal] laws by such criteria 
 
 
 425. See Income Tax Regulations, 1936, reg. 177 (Austl.). 
 426. Question 2(a) of the Case Stated, Austin (2003) 215 C.L.R. at 187–88. 
 427. Id. at 207 (Gleeson, C.J.). 
 428. Id. at 222 (Gleeson, C.J.), 267 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.), 285 (McHugh, J.). 
 429. Id. at 246–47 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.) (quoting Re State Pub. Serv. Fed’n, Ex 
parte Att’y Gen. (W. Austl.) (1993) 178 C.L.R. 249, 296 (Toohey, J.)). 
 430. Id. at 249 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.), 301 (Kirby, J.). Justice McHugh disagreed. 
Id. at 281.  
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as ‘special burden’ and ‘curtailment’ of ‘capacity’ of the [s]tates ‘to 
function as governments.’431 
Applying this test, why were the Imposition and Assessment Acts 
invalid in their application to the first plaintiff? For the joint Justices, 
determination of the terms and conditions upon which judges are 
appointed and remunerated were matters for the States.432 Moreover, 
remuneration included the provision of retirement (and similar) benefits to 
state judges, their spouses and dependents.433 It was entirely a matter for 
States to choose how to remunerate their judges.434 Although the 
Imposition and Assessment Acts did not directly burden the State, the joint 
Justices placed significance upon the fact that by taxing individual judges 
the federal legislation might impact the States’ ability to entice the best 
candidates into accepting judicial positions.435 Of course, state legislatures 
are not constitutionally immune from federal laws of “general 
application.” However, in the joint Justices’ view, this federal legislation 
could not be considered a law of general application because it gave 
differential treatment to “high-income members of constitutionally 
protected superannuation funds.”436  
For Chief Justice Gleeson, the critical issue was interference.437 
Allowing the Federal Parliament to “dictate to the States” the terms upon 
which judges were to be engaged, or to “single out” state judges by 
imposing a special financial burden upon them would constitute 
interference with the “capacity of States to function as governments.”438 
The differential treatment of state judges was constitutionally 
impermissible because the legislation interfered with the States’ 
arrangements for judicial remuneration and not because of the financial 
burden it placed on the States.439 
 
 
 431. Id. at 249. This majority’s approach may be contrasted with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985), which rejected as “unsound in principle and unworkable 
in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of 
whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’” There is, however, a real 
question as to whether this stance was reconsidered in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991), 
which deemed it relevant that a State’s mandatory judicial retirement provision “is a decision of the 
most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.”  
 432. Austin (2003) 215 C.L.R. at 261 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.). 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. at 261–62. 
 435. Id. at 262–63. 
 436. Id. at 263. 
 437. Id. at 219–20 (Gleeson, C.J.). 
 438. Id. at 219. 
 439. Id. 
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Justice McHugh departed from the majority on the question of the two-
stage approach.440 However, his reasoning as to why the Austin legislation 
was invalid was similar to that of Chief Justice Gleeson and the joint 
Justices. Justice McHugh emphasized that this legislation discriminated 
against state judicial officers “in a way that interferes in a significant 
respect with the States’ relationships with their judges.”441 In Justice 
McHugh’s view, this legislation singled out state judges by placing a 
“financial burden on them that no one else in the community incurs.”442  
Justice Kirby, the only dissenter, expressed his agreement with much of 
the joint Justices’ analysis of the Melbourne Corporation doctrine443 and, 
in particular, agreed that the two limbs of the doctrine identified in 
previous cases were really “manifestations of the one constitutional 
implication.”444 Justice Kirby agreed that States must retain power over 
their selection and retention of judges, including power over judicial 
remuneration (which included judicial pension entitlements).445 Where 
Justice Kirby disagreed with the joint Justices was whether imposing the 
federal surcharge tax had “a significant and detrimental effect on the 
power of a State to determine the terms and conditions affecting the 
remuneration of its judges.”446 In Justice Kirby’s view, the answer was 
negative because appropriate candidates would continue to be willing to 
take up positions as state judges despite the financial disadvantages 
imposed by this federal legislation.447 
Austin conferred constitutional immunity on state judges from this 
federal tax. It reaffirmed the importance both of federalism as a 
constitutional principle and of the Melbourne Corporation doctrine as a 
way of protecting States’ independence from federal interference. From a 
comparative perspective, the High Court’s reasoning resonates with that of 
Gregory, a U.S. case dealing with a constitutional challenge to a 
mandatory retirement provision for judges in the Missouri Constitution.448 
Gregory underlines the growing significance of a line of authority in 
American constitutional law recognizing “the authority of the people of 
the States to determine the qualifications of their most important 
 
 
 440. Id. at 281 (McHugh, J.). 
 441. Id. at 283. 
 442. Id.  
 443. Id. at 299 (Kirby, J.). 
 444. Id. at 301. 
 445. Id. at 303. 
 446. Id. at 304. 
 447. Id. at 305. 
 448. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452. 
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government officials” which thereby imposes an essential, but not 
absolute, limit on congressional power.449 Nevertheless, the significance of 
Austin and other Australian federalism cases will need to be reassessed in 
the light of the High Court’s 2006 decision in New South Wales v. 
Commonwealth (Work Choices Case).450  
5. Constitution and the Common Law 
One aspect of the Gleeson Court’s jurisprudence that is particularly 
interesting from a judicial review standpoint is its development of the 
relationship between the Constitution and the common law. When the 
Australian Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1901, an established 
body of common law already existed.451 The Australian colonies that 
formed the new federal nation of Australia were part of the British Empire 
and had been governed by the English legal system, including the English 
common law.452 Thus, the Constitution’s context was that of “an imperial 
context.”453 It was understood that the Constitution would be interpreted 
against the background of existing common law doctrines,454 even though 
the common law was an increasingly complicated concept, variously 
described as English, State, Commonwealth, and Australian common 
law.455 A more difficult issue, which only began to receive sustained 
judicial and academic interest in the 1990s, is how the Constitution might 
influence the ongoing development of the common law. The High Court 
first directly considered this question in Lange456 against the background 
of the Court’s prior recognition of the implied constitutional freedom of 
political communication.457 Specifically, the Lange Court considered how 
the recognition of this constitutional freedom would affect the 
 
 
 449. Id. at 463 (O’Connor, J.). 
 450. After this Article was accepted for publication, the Gleeson Court handed down its decision 
in N.S.W. v. Commonwealth (2006) 231 A.L.R. 1, a Gleeson Court decision of tremendous legal and 
political significance in which the Court dismissed a challenge by five states and two trade unions to 
the constitutionality of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act, 2005 (Austl.). 
 451. Leslie Zines, The Common Law in Australia: Its Nature and Constitutional Significance, 32 
FED. L. REV. 337, 339–43 (2004) [hereinafter Zines IV]. 
 452. See id. at 339–40. 
 453. B. M. Selway, Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High Court of Australia, 
14 PUB. L. REV. 234, 234 (2003). 
 454. Sir Owen Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation, in JESTING 
PILATE, supra note 94, at 203.  
 455. Zines IV, supra note 451, at 342–43. 
 456. Lange (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520. 
 457. Theophanous (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, Stephens (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211, Nationwide News 
(1992) 177 C.L.R. 1, A.C.T.V. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106. 
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development of the common law of defamation. On this question, the 
Lange Court stated: “Of necessity, the common law must conform with 
the Constitution. The development of the common law in Australia cannot 
run counter to constitutional imperatives. The common law and the 
requirements of the Constitution cannot be at odds.”458 
Applying this principle, the Lange Court developed the common law of 
defamation in a manner consistent with the implied freedom of political 
communication. Subsequently, in John Pfeiffer Proprietary Ltd. v. 
Rogerson,459 the Gleeson Court held that the common law of choice of law 
in tort “should be developed to take into account various matters arising 
from the Australian constitutional text and structure.”460 Thus, it is now 
well established that Australian common law cannot be inconsistent with 
constitutional “imperatives.” Beyond the scope of constitutional 
imperatives, John Pfeiffer suggests an increased influence of the 
Constitution on common law development. But, it remains unclear 
precisely how that influence might work.461  
6. Conclusion 
The Gleeson Court has significantly retreated from the Mason Court’s 
activist approach to the exercise of judicial review and, in doing so, has 
sought to reaffirm the Court’s commitment to constitutional legalism.462 
This is particularly evident in the Gleeson Court’s reluctance to recognize 
new constitutionally implied rights or freedoms, and its treatment of the 
implied freedom of political communication and the Kable doctrines. 
However, the range of approaches among the Gleeson Court Justices—
particularly with respect to drawing constitutional implications—may lead 
to different (and perhaps surprising) results in future cases. Moreover, the 
Gleeson Court’s legalism does not mean the Court is unwilling to deliver 
decisions that are protective of vulnerable persons, as Crampton463 
 
 
 458. Lange (1997) 189 C.L.R. at 566 (footnote omitted). 
 459. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 503. 
 460. Id. at 534 (Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne, JJ.). 
 461. See generally Adrienne Stone, Freedom of Political Communication, the Constitution and the 
Common Law, 26 FED. L. REV. 219 (1998); Greg Taylor, The Effect of the Constitution on the 
Common Law as Revealed by John Pfeiffer v. Rogerson, 30 FED. L. REV. 69 (2002); Greg Taylor, Why 
the Common Law Should Be Only Indirectly Affected by Constitutional Guarantees: A Comment on 
Stone, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 623 (2002); Adrienne Stone, The Common Law and the Constitution: A 
Reply, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 646 (2002); Kathleen Foley, The Australian Constitution’s Influence on 
the Common Law, 31 FED. L. REV. 131 (2003). 
 462. See, e.g., Selway, supra note 453, at 250. 
 463. (2000) 206 C.L.R. 161. 
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demonstrates, or unwilling to make politically controversial decisions, as 
evidenced by Re Wakim.464  
CONCLUSION 
Two key points emerge. First, despite the lack of express authorization 
in the Constitution, judicial review has been an accepted part of 
Australia’s constitutional system since Federation. Second, the High 
Court’s exercise of its judicial review power has been marked by an 
enduring commitment to constitutional legalism, a commitment only 
briefly interrupted by the Mason Court. 
In the High Court’s formative years, although there were some early 
signs of a more creative approach to constitutional interpretation, the 
Engineers’ Case465 established a constitutional methodology of strict 
legalism that has since dominated the Court’s constitutional decision-
making. When applied to the interpretation of section 117 of the 
Constitution, the legalistic approach narrowed that provision in a way that 
was not only contrary to its purpose but dramatically reduced section 
117’s rights-protective potential. As demonstrated by the Communist 
Party Case,466 however, the High Court was not afraid to exercise its 
judicial review power to strike down legislation it considered to involve an 
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power—despite the political 
pressures surrounding the case.  
The second phase considered by this Article—that of the Mason 
Court—was a period of great change for the High Court. In line with the 
Court’s new position at the apex of Australia’s judicial system and 
Australia’s growing sense of national and international identity, the Mason 
Court broke with the past and adopted a more robust approach to its 
judicial review power. The early High Court’s focus on text was 
broadened to also give effect to purpose. The traditional view of the 
Constitution as primarily concerned with federalism was replaced with a 
conception that included an overt concern for the protection of individual 
rights. There was an increased willingness to overturn precedent, to take 
into account developments in international and foreign law, and frankness 
about its policy-driven approach to judicial decision-making. The Mason 
Court’s activism was, however, the source of a good deal of controversy. 
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Such sustained public scrutiny of the High Court’s work was 
unprecedented in Australia and certainly has not been repeated.  
The third phase considered by this Article, the Glesson Court, 
evidences a return to the constitutional legalism of the pre-Mason Court 
era. With the exception of Justice Kirby, the Gleeson Court’s decision-
making demonstrates a renewed commitment to Dixonian principles. 
Moreover, there has been a shift of focus away from rights-based 
jurisprudence to the development of doctrines arising from Chapter III of 
the Constitution.  
Questions remain, of course. In particular, how should the Court’s 
approach to judicial review be evaluated? Is the lack of anxiety in 
Australia about judicial review to be attributed to the way in which the 
Court has exercised its power, or are there other factors at play? For 
example, is the secure position of judicial review within Australia’s legal 
system due to the fact that the focus of Australia’s Constitution is 
federalism, not constitutional protection of individual rights?467 Does the 
Court’s adoption of a legalistic approach to judicial review reduce the 
potential for the protection of rights under Australia’s Constitution in a 
way that should concern Australians? Or, is the Court right to be reluctant 
to imply rights and freedoms into the Constitution given the counter-
majoritarian concerns arguably inherent in such a constitutional decision-
making process?468 At least one conclusion is obvious: Australian judicial 
review requires more sustained scholarly attention to provide a deeper, 
more complex account of how Australia’s Constitution is understood. 
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 468. Id. at 7. 
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